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CRIMINAL EMPLOYMENT LAW 
Benjamin Levin† 
This Article diagnoses a phenomenon, “criminal employment law,” which 
exists at the nexus of employment law and the criminal justice system. Courts and 
legislatures discourage employers from hiring workers with criminal records and 
encourage employers to discipline workers for non-work-related criminal 
misconduct. In analyzing this phenomenon, my goals are threefold: (1) to examine 
how criminal employment law works; (2) to hypothesize why criminal employment 
law has proliferated; and (3) to assess what is wrong with criminal employment law. 
This Article examines the ways in which the laws that govern the workplace create 
incentives for employers not to hire individuals with criminal records and to 
discharge employees based on non-workplace criminal misconduct. In this way, 
private employers effectively operate as a branch of the criminal legal system. But 
private employers act without constitutional or significant structural checks. 
Therefore, I argue that the criminal system has altered the nature of employment, 
while employment law doctrines have altered the nature of criminal punishment. 
Employment law scholars should be concerned about the role of criminal records in 
restricting entry into the formal labor market. And criminal law scholars should be 
concerned about how employment restrictions extend criminal punishment, shifting 
punitive authority and decision-making power to unaccountable private employers. 
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The shadow of criminal law looms large over the U.S. labor market. 
A criminal record sharply decreases a job applicant’s likelihood of 
gaining employment, and employers’ refusal to hire formerly 
incarcerated applicants has led to a growing population of unemployed 
and underemployed people with criminal records.1 Every year, more 
than 600,000 people are released from prison, but, a year after release, 
over seventy-five percent of them remain jobless.2 While parole boards 
treat employment as a powerful guard against recidivism,3 the legal 
system imposes a range of structural obstacles that make it very hard for 
people with criminal records to find work. 
The difficulty finding and keeping a job thus serves as a significant 
collateral consequence of the criminal justice system—a harm that 
accompanies criminal conviction, charge, and even arrest.4 While 
 
 1 See, e.g., JAMES B. JACOBS, THE ETERNAL CRIMINAL RECORD 275–300 (2015); DEVAH 
PAGER, MARKED: RACE, CRIME, AND FINDING WORK IN AN ERA OF MASS INCARCERATION 28–
41 (2007); JEREMY TRAVIS, BUT THEY ALL COME BACK: FACING THE CHALLENGES OF PRISONER 
REENTRY 151–85 (2005). 
 2 See PAGER, supra note 1, at 5, 28. 
 3 See id. at 26; JONATHAN SIMON, POOR DISCIPLINE: PAROLE AND THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF 
THE UNDERCLASS, 1890–1990 192–93 (1993). 
 4 See, e.g., Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 365 (2010); Parker v. Ellis, 362 U.S. 574, 593–
94 (1960) (Warren, C.J., dissenting); MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS 
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incarceration, probation, and other formal vehicles of punishment are 
explicitly designed to respond to law breaking, these formal sanctions 
are only one effect of conviction. As the carceral state has expanded, so 
too have civil consequences of conviction—consequences that have 
proliferated and grown more severe.5 Loss of employment opportunities 
(along with loss of housing, disenfranchisement, ineligibility for public 
benefits, and deportation) may result in greater and longer-lasting 
harms than the traditional forms of statutorily or judicially mandated 
punishment.6 These consequences have wreaked havoc in low-income 
communities, particularly low-income communities of color.7 Scholars 
have grappled with ways to reduce these collateral costs or ways to make 
them more transparent, so that criminal defendants might weigh them 
when considering guilty pleas, judges might factor them into sentencing 
 
INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 143 (2010); A.B.A., ABA STANDARDS FOR 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE: COLLATERAL SANCTIONS AND DISCRETIONARY DISQUALIFICATION OF 
CONVICTED PERSONS (3d ed. 2004); Margaret Colgate Love, Managing Collateral Consequences 
in the Sentencing Process: The Revised Sentencing Articles of the Model Penal Code, 2015 WIS. L. 
REV. 247, 249 [hereinafter Managing Collateral Consequences]; Michael Pinard, Collateral 
Consequences of Criminal Convictions: Confronting Issues of Race and Dignity, 85 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 457, 459 (2010) [hereinafter Confronting Issues]; Jenny Roberts, Why Misdemeanors 
Matter: Defining Effective Advocacy in the Lower Criminal Courts, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 277, 
299 (2011). 
 5 See A.B.A., supra note 4, at 8; Kathleen M. Olivares et al., The Collateral Consequences of 
a Felony Conviction: A National Study of State Legal Codes 10 Years Later, 60 FED. PROBATION 
10, 14–15 (1996) (“[An] analysis of state legal codes reveals an increase between 1986 and 1996 
in the extent to which states restrict the rights of convicted felons. . . . [T]here was an increase 
in the number of states restricting six rights; voting, holding office, parenting, divorce, firearm 
ownership, and criminal registration increased.”); Jenny Roberts, The Mythical Divide Between 
Collateral and Direct Consequences of Criminal Convictions: Involuntary Commitment of 
“Sexually Violent Predators”, 93 MINN. L. REV. 670, 673–74 (2008); Project Description: 
National Inventory of Collateral Consequences of Conviction, JUSTICE CTR. [hereinafter 
NICCC], http://niccc.csgjusticecenter.org/description (last visited Apr. 7, 2018) (“While 
collateral consequences have been a familiar feature of the American justice system since 
colonial times, they have become more pervasive and more problematic in the past 20 years for 
three reasons: they are more numerous and impactfal [sic], they affect more people, and they 
are harder to avoid or mitigate. As a result, millions of Americans are consigned to a kind of a 
permanent legal limbo because of a crime they committed in the past.”). 
 6 See generally 21 U.S.C. § 862a (2012) (denying benefits to individuals convicted of certain 
drug-related offenses); 42 U.S.C. § 13661 (2012) (restricting housing assistance for those with 
drug-related convictions); Harry J. Holzer et al., Will Employers Hire Former Offenders?: 
Employer Preferences, Background Checks, and Their Determinants, in IMPRISONING AMERICA: 
THE SOCIAL EFFECTS OF MASS INCARCERATION 205 (Mary Pattillo et al. eds., 2004) (discussing 
employment challenges for former offenders); Jeremy Travis, Invisible Punishment: An 
Instrument of Social Exclusion, in INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT: THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF 
MASS IMPRISONMENT 15, 18–25 (Marc Mauer & Meda Chesney-Lind eds., 2002) (discussing the 
ways in which non-criminal statutes bar individuals with criminal records from obtaining a 
range of public benefits); Pamela S. Karlan, Convictions and Doubts: Retribution, 
Representation, and the Debate over Felon Disenfranchisement, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1147 (2004) 
(describing the process of felon disenfranchisement). 
 7 See generally JACOBS, supra note 1, at 280–81; PAGER, supra note 1 (showing how 
criminal records harm black job applicants more than white applicants); BRUCE WESTERN, 
PUNISHMENT AND INEQUALITY IN AMERICA 6 (2006). 
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determinations, and legislators might act to mitigate their effects.8 
However, the role of private employers in this shadow criminal system 
remains underexplored. 
This Article describes a phenomenon, “criminal employment law,” 
which exists at the nexus of employment law and the criminal system. 
For those with criminal records, the life-altering effects of their past 
run-in(s) with the law shape their legal rights and opportunities in the 
labor market. The laws of the workplace empower employers to 
discipline workers in response to non-workplace misconduct, and the 
tort doctrines of negligent hiring and retention expose employers to 
potential liability if they hire people with criminal records.9 Therefore, 
private employers have become critical players in the contemporary 
criminal system.10 But, at the same time, they remain critical sources of 
social services—health care, childcare, etc. This Article treats collateral 
consequences in the labor market as a window into a troubling and 
under-appreciated dynamic in the criminal system: the role of private 
actors and institutions in the delivery and design of punishment.11 
My goals are threefold: (1) to examine how criminal employment 
 
 8 See, e.g., Gabriel J. Chin, The New Civil Death: Rethinking Punishment in the Era of Mass 
Conviction, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1789, 1825–32 (2012) [hereinafter Chin, The New Civil Death]; 
Love, supra note 4, at 249; Margaret Colgate Love & Gabriel J. Chin, Old Wine in a New Skin: 
The ABA Standards on Collateral Sanctions and Discretionary Disqualification of Convicted 
Persons, 16 FED. SENT’G REP. 232, 232 (2004); Michael Pinard, An Integrated Perspective on the 
Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions and Reentry Issues Faced by Formerly 
Incarcerated Individuals, 86 B.U. L. REV. 623, 686–90 (2006) [hereinafter Pinard, An Integrated 
Perspective]. 
 9 See, e.g., El v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth. (SEPTA), 479 F.3d 232 (3d Cir. 2007); Jessica A. 
Clarke, Against Immutability, 125 YALE L.J. 2, 76–85 (2015); Elizabeth A. Gerlach, The 
Background Check Balancing Act: Protecting Applicants with Criminal Convictions While 
Encouraging Criminal Background Checks in Hiring, 8 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 981, 988 (2006). 
 10 By stressing the fluid boundaries of the criminal system, this Article contributes to a 
growing literature that questions whether the administration of criminal law constitutes a 
“system” at all. See, e.g., Bernard E. Harcourt, The Influence of Systems Analysis on Criminal 
Law and Procedure: A Critique of a Style of Judicial Decision-Making (Columbia Pub. Law 
Research, Paper No. 14-562, 2013), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
3062900 (tracing the use of “criminal justice system” as a concept in legal and social thought); 
Sara Mayeux, The Idea of the “Criminal Justice System”, AM. J. CRIM. L. (forthcoming 2018), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3050263 (same); John F. Pfaff, Waylaid by 
a Metaphor: A Deeply Problematic Account of Prison Growth, 111 MICH. L. REV. 1087, 1089 
(2013). 
 11 While sociologists have studied empirically the problems of reentry into the labor market 
for those with criminal records, see, e.g., Holzer, supra note 6; PAGER, supra note 1, and while 
others have begun to address the legal framework for discrimination against ex-offenders in the 
labor market, see, e.g., Leroy D. Clark, A Civil Rights Task: Removing Barriers to Employment of 
Ex-Convicts, 38 U.S.F. L. REV. 193, 196–97 (2004), the relationship between employment 
consequences and employment law has gone largely unexplored and un-critiqued. Cf. NOAH 
ZATZ ET AL., UCLA INST. FOR RESEARCH ON LABOR & EMP’T, GET TO WORK OR GO TO JAIL: 
WORKPLACE RIGHTS UNDER THREAT (Mar. 2016), http://www.labor.ucla.edu/publication/get-
to-work-or-go-to-jail (examining terms of release that are premised on the ability to retain 
employment). 
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law works; (2) to hypothesize why criminal employment law has 
proliferated; and (3) to assess what is wrong with criminal employment 
law. This Article examines the ways in which the laws that govern the 
workplace encourage employers to reject job applicants with criminal 
records and to discharge employees based on non-workplace 
misconduct. I argue that through these legal mechanisms private 
employers effectively operate as a branch of the criminal system without 
constitutional or significant structural checks. Therefore, this Article 
argues that the criminal system has altered the nature of employment, 
while employment law doctrines have altered the nature of criminal 
punishment. 
Criminal law’s collateral consequences in the employment sphere 
should be cause for concern for many of the reasons collateral 
consequences in general are cause for concern (including that they 
operate as “invisible” punishment).12 But the collateral consequences in 
the employment sphere raise an additional set of concerns because they 
ostensibly arise outside of the criminal system and often depend on the 
decisions, preferences, and incentives of private actors. By focusing on 
private employers and their public function in extending the effects of 
punishment, I argue that criminal employment law illustrates structural 
flaws with both the criminal system and the legal status of employment. 
Employment and labor law scholars should be concerned about the 
shadow economy of those who are unwelcome in the formal labor 
market as a result of past criminal convictions (or even arrests).13 By 
tying employer liability to criminal records, the legal system invites (and 
often requires) employers to monitor their employees’ behavior away 
from work. At the same time, criminal law scholars should consider 
how employment restrictions might serve as extensions of criminal 
punishment and how the involvement of private employers might 
complicate discussions of criminal justice reform. If private 
employment provides the vehicle through which workers access critical 
benefits, then public functions of the welfare state are necessarily filtered 
through the actions, decisions, and preferences of private employers. 
Employers’ role as disciplining force is reflected not only in the tort 
law doctrines of negligent hiring and retention,14 but also in the public 
 
 12 See Travis, supra note 6, at 15–16; see also Love & Chin, supra note 8, at 232 (“One goal 
of the new [ABA] Standards [on collateral consequences] is to encourage awareness of the full 
legal consequences of a criminal conviction, particularly those that are mandatory upon 
conviction. There is no justification for the legal system to operate in ignorance of the effects of 
its actions.”). 
 13 I distinguish between punishment and arrest here, but it is worth noting that many of the 
consequences of formal criminal punishment also attach at the arrest stage, substantially 
widening the pool of those drawn into the criminal system’s ambit. See generally Eisha Jain, 
Arrests as Regulation, 67 STAN. L. REV. 809 (2015). 
 14 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 317 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1965); Stacy A. 
Hickox, Employer Liability for Negligent Hiring of Ex-Offenders, 55 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1001, 1006 
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demand for and proliferation of employee conduct policies that put 
employers in a position to punish workers for non-work-related 
criminal misconduct.15 Such doctrines and policies may be appealing—
we as a society may want employers to assume this role as a cost of 
doing business and to be responsible for the conduct of their employees. 
But this Article will consider the effects of such a legal framework. My 
claim is not that employers should never be permitted to consider a job 
applicant’s or employee’s allegedly criminal conduct. Rather, my goal is 
to assess how those consequences operate and to confront the costs of 
employer decision-making as an extension of criminal punishment. To 
the extent that involvement with the criminal system is creating or 
preserving a racial and socioeconomic underclass,16 it is important to 
ask how the classifications operate in practice. If employers effectively 
operate as an arm of the criminal system, do criminal procedure 
principles have a place in the employment law pantheon? And to the 
extent that such an application would be inappropriate, should we also 
be skeptical about delegating criminal justice–related tasks to employers 
in the first place? 
In an effort to address these questions, this Article will proceed in 
four Parts. The Article will first ask how and why criminal employment 
law has proliferated, before turning to the costs of criminal employment 
law. Part I will describe how criminal employment law fits into the 
broader scholarly discussion of collateral consequences. Next, Part II 
will examine how criminal employment law operates and will provide 
an overview of its legal architecture and justifications. This Part will 
focus on two areas of law that shape employer incentives and regulate 
the employment relationship: (1) the tort doctrines of negligent hiring 
and negligent retention and (2) personnel or employee conduct policies 
 
(2011) (collecting cases). 
 15 See, e.g., Janine Young Kim & Matthew J. Parlow, Off-Court Misbehavior: Sports Leagues 
and Private Punishment, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 573, 575–79 (2009); Bethany P. 
Withers, The Integrity of the Game: Professional Athletes and Domestic Violence, 1 HARV. J. 
SPORTS & ENT. L. 145, 150 (2010); Note, Out of Bounds: Professional Sports Leagues and 
Domestic Violence, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1048, 1049 (1996); David Post, Justice, Ferguson MO, and 
the NFL, WASH. POST: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Dec. 5, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/12/05/justice-ferguson-mo-and-the-nfl. 
 16 See generally ALEXANDER, supra note 4 (arguing that the criminal system has created a 
socially, politically, and legally marginalized class of black men); James Forman, Jr., Why Care 
About Mass Incarceration?, 108 MICH. L. REV. 993, 1003 (2010) (arguing that aggressive 
policing of low-income communities of color “told students that no matter what they do, their 
race, poverty, and political powerlessness will always mark them as outlaws, available for 
degradation whenever the state chooses”); Michael Pinard, Criminal Records, Race and 
Redemption, 16 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 963, 969 (2013) (“As a result, poor individuals of 
color disproportionately bear the mark of a criminal record. This is perhaps the heaviest 
possible burden to carry, as the effects of a criminal record are long-lasting and often 
permanent. For those who are convicted, these effects include the essentially countless legal 
disabilities—termed collateral consequences . . . .”). 
2018] C RI MIN A L E MP LO Y ME N T  LA W  2271 
that provide for employee discharge or discipline based on non-work-
related interactions with the criminal system. While these two legal 
areas are distinct and implicate the criminal system in different ways, 
they both allow for employers to advance or exacerbate the punitive 
effect of underlying state action (e.g., arrest, conviction, etc.). 
Next, Part III will examine further the justifications for criminal 
employment law by (1) situating it within the literature on the collateral 
consequences of conviction and (2) considering the limitations of 
possible policy solutions. This Part will survey briefly a set of policy 
responses that courts or legislators might adopt to check the impact of 
tort liability and conduct policies on the work-lives of individuals with 
criminal records. I will look to policy proposals aimed at reducing 
employment consequences for the previously incarcerated: (1) 
modification of the negligent hiring/retention tort doctrines; (2) “ban 
the box” laws that restrict employers from considering criminal history 
in hiring decisions17; (3) traditional employment discrimination 
principles; (4) contractual solutions to employers’ private conduct 
policies; and (5) integration of employment considerations into 
sentencing determinations. I will describe the potential benefits of each 
solution, but by emphasizing the persistent problems associated with the 
role of private employers in the criminal punishment (and even 
rehabilitative) enterprise, I also will note the ways in which each might 
fall short. 
Part IV will turn to the costs of criminal employment law by asking 
what is wrong with this legal regime. This Part will continue the focus 
on the status of criminal employment law as a public/private and 
civil/criminal hybrid. To the extent that relaxing the state action 
doctrine and extending procedural protections to private employers are 
unpalatable or problematic solutions, this Article will ask why. Or, 
perhaps more importantly, if constitutional criminal procedure 
principles do not have a role to play in the workplace, why should 
private employers be asked to, expected to, or allowed to operate as 
disciplinary institutions tasked with punishing worker malfeasance that 
does not affect the workplace? By exploring the answer to this question, 
I hope to examine the costs of the hybrid public/private approach to 
employment law and the significant social costs of encouraging private 
actors to further punitive ends. 
Ultimately, I will argue that criminal employment law has a lot to 
tell us about both the structure of criminal punishment and the nature 
of employment. I highlight how employment law doctrines and 
employment consequences shape and are shaped by the criminal system 
 
 17 See generally Johnathan J. Smith, Banning the Box but Keeping the Discrimination?: 
Disparate Impact and Employers’ Overreliance on Criminal Background Checks, 49 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 197, 211–15 (2014) (describing the “ban the box” movement and its goals). 
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and how a comprehensive reform movement must engage with these 
ostensibly disparate legal areas and grapple with the pathologies and 
power dynamics of the employment relationship. 
I.     THE CONTEXT OF CRIMINAL EMPLOYMENT LAW 
In some sense, criminal employment law operates as a 
quintessential collateral consequence of criminal punishment.18 An 
individual is convicted, arrested, charged, or subject to some state 
action, and, as a result, she faces a new set of challenges not specifically 
identified by the sentencing judge, arresting officer, or relevant law 
enforcement personnel.19 
But my treatment of criminal employment law differs from most 
scholarly accounts of collateral consequences. The growing literature on 
collateral consequences (including employment consequences) 
generally treats these effects as a public law problem.20 That is, scholars 
and advocates have trained their fire on formal collateral 
consequences—statutes that explicitly restrict the rights of individuals 
with criminal records. 
For example, in its 2003 Model Standards on the “Collateral 
Sanctions and Discretionary Disqualification of Convicted Persons,” the 
American Bar Association (ABA) Task Force on Collateral Sanctions 
and Discretionary Disqualification of Convicted Persons laid out a 
comprehensive proposal to address the growing web of collateral 
consequences.21 While the Standards distinguish between “collateral 
sanction[s]” (consequences that attach automatically) and 
“discretionary disqualification[s]” (consequences that the state is 
“authorized but not required to impose on a person convicted of an 
offense on grounds related to the conviction”), they only address state 
action.22 That is, the Standards focus on how state actors make 
 
 18 See A.B.A., supra note 4, at 7–9; Chin, The New Civil Death, supra note 8, at 1791; 
Roberts, supra note 5, at 673. 
 19 See Gilchrist v. Bd. of Review, 94 P.3d 72, 77 n.5 (Okla. 2004); Pinard, An Integrated 
Perspective, supra note 8, at 635–36. 
 20 See, e.g., Gabriel J. Chin & Margaret Love, Status as Punishment: A Critical Guide to 
Padilla v. Kentucky, 25 CRIM. JUST. 21, 26 (2010); Nora V. Demleitner, “Collateral Damage”: No 
Re-Entry for Drug Offenders, 47 VILL. L. REV. 1027 (2002); Sandra J. Mullings, Employment of 
Ex-Offenders: The Time Has Come for a True Antidiscrimination Statute, 64 SYRACUSE L. REV. 
261, 295 (2014); David Wolitz, The Stigma of Conviction: Coram Nobis, Civil Disabilities, and 
the Right to Clear One’s Name, 2009 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1277, 1312–13 (“The most tangible of the 
non-legal consequences of conviction is the loss of employment prospects.”). 
 21 See A.B.A., supra note 4, at 8–13. The Report does, however, use “collateral 
consequences” as a general descriptive term. For purposes of clarity and simplicity (and in 
keeping with most scholarly literature in the area), this Article will refer to “collateral 
consequences” rather than the two subcategories defined by the ABA. 
 22 Id. § 19-1.1. 
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decisions, but they have little to say about consequences shaped by 
private actors and “private law.”23 
Addressing these formal collateral consequences certainly is critical 
to understanding and reforming the realities of the criminal system. But 
these consequences are only part of a bigger picture. By focusing 
exclusively on statutes and state actors, the Standards—and much 
collateral consequences scholarship—understate the role of private 
actors and attendant common law and private social regimes.24 
This Article departs from the Standards’ approach in order to 
address “informal” collateral consequences. “Unlike formal collateral 
consequences, such as loss of public housing eligibility, deportation, 
occupational disqualification, or electoral disenfranchisement,” Wayne 
Logan explains, “informal” consequences “do not attach by express 
operation of law.”25 Informal collateral consequences “aris[e] 
independently of specific legal authority, and concern the gamut of 
negative social, economic, medical, and psychological consequences of 
conviction.”26 In introducing this distinction, Logan has argued that 
legal scholars’ important work on collateral consequences has 
undervalued the significance of these informal consequences.27 
This Article’s focus on the role of private employers in the criminal 
system is intended to respond to Logan. In examining criminal 
employment law, this Article takes up and continues the larger project 
of considering the informal collateral consequences and the legal and 
social conditions that shape them. The institutions of criminal 
employment law that I address depend on the conduct of private 
employers and a range of (at least ostensibly) private social orderings, 
rather than statutory diktats.28 While the employment decisions and 
 
 23 See generally John C.P. Goldberg, Introduction: Pragmatism and Private Law, 125 HARV. 
L. REV. 1640, 1640–41 (2012) (opposing the legal realist position that all law is public, and 
defining “private law” as “includ[ing] the common law subjects that have long been central to 
U.S. legal education–contracts, property, and torts”). While this Article challenges the 
public/private distinction and therefore relies on a realist account of the way in which the law 
functions, I use “private law” and “public law” as descriptive phrases in much the same way as 
Goldberg does. 
 24 Indeed, taking “criminal justice” and “criminal justice reform” seriously should require 
us to appreciate the ways in which the criminal system affects and is affected by legal doctrines 
and institutions that appear far removed from the traditional realms of substantive and 
procedural criminal law. See, e.g., Sharon Dolovich & Alexandra Natapoff, Introduction: 
Mapping the New Criminal Justice Thinking, in THE NEW CRIMINAL JUSTICE THINKING 1 
(Sharon Dolovich & Alexandra Natapoff eds., 2017); Benjamin Levin, Book Review, Rethinking 
the Boundaries of ‘Criminal Justice’, 15 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 619 (2018). 
 25 See Wayne A. Logan, Informal Collateral Consequences, 88 WASH. L. REV. 1103, 1104 
(2013). 
 26 Id. 
 27 Id. 
 28 As noted in Part II, there certainly are employment-related collateral consequences that 
would fall into the “collateral sanctions” category, as they rest on statutory bans on licensing, 
employment, etc. See JACOBS, supra note 1, at 261–62 (collecting statutes). 
2274 C ARD O Z O  L A W R E V IE W  [Vol. 39:2265 
legal regimes outlined in this Article may be responsive to statutory, 
common-law, or consumerist pressures, they hardly fall into the ABA 
Standards’ framework. Instead they rest on an even more opaque set of 
decisions and decision-makers.29 
I do not mean to undersell the important work that other collateral 
consequences scholarship and the ABA taskforce have done in bringing 
“invisible punishment” to the fore and deconstructing the 
direct/collateral distinction. This distinction has been critiqued rightly 
as “formalistic,” “outdated,” and “unprincipled.30 Indeed, dating at least 
to the 1950s, criminal law practitioners and scholars have attempted to 
catalog and curb collateral consequences.31 Drafted in 1962, decades 
before the rise of scholarly attention to collateral consequences, section 
306.6 of the Model Penal Code explicitly addressed the need to confront 
these harms by granting the sentencing court the authority to enter an 
order eliminating “any disqualification or disability imposed by law 
because of the conviction . . . .”32 While this provision of the Model 
Penal Code has failed to gain acceptance, recent work is a big step in the 
right direction. 
That being said, the exclusive focus on “formal” collateral 
consequences understates the scope of the problem faced by individuals 
with criminal records. Further, by failing to address informal collateral 
consequences, the current discourse invites policy solutions that fail to 
remedy much discrimination against those with criminal records.33 
Therefore, this Article argues that criminal employment law—a class of 
“informal” collateral consequences—requires the same attention as 
mandatory or “formal” collateral consequences. 
My claim is that criminal employment law mirrors the same 
patterns as formal collateral consequences and risks producing similar 
effects. Certainly, as a descriptive matter there is a difference between a 
consequence that attaches automatically or via state action and one that 
does not—the latter necessarily implicates the discretion of private 
actors and, as a result, is less predictable.34 That is, informal collateral 
 
 29 See Eisha Jain, Prosecuting Collateral Consequences, 104 GEO. L.J. 1197, 1241 (2016); 
Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1313, 1317 (2012) (“More broadly, 
misdemeanor processing reveals the deep structure of the criminal system: as a pyramid that 
functions relatively transparently and according to legal principle at the top, but in an opaque 
and unprincipled way for the vast majority of cases at the bottom.”). 
 30 Roberts, supra note 5, at 672–73. 
 31 See JACOBS, supra note 1, at 248; Margaret Colgate Love, Starting over with a Clean Slate: 
In Praise of a Forgotten Section of the Model Penal Code, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1705, 1709 
(2003) [hereinafter Love, Starting over]. 
 32 Model Penal Code § 306.6(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1962). But the shift from a rehabilitative to 
a punitive approach to criminal justice in the following decades saw a move to eliminate “civil 
death” after a conviction largely forgotten. See Love, Starting over, supra note 31, at 1713–16. 
 33 See generally infra Part III. 
 34 It is worth noting that, given empirical research on employers’ hiring preferences, it 
would not be unreasonable to conclude that difficulty in finding employment post-conviction is 
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consequences like criminal employment law are even collateral to the 
consequences treated as collateral consequences by legal scholars. But, if 
these private decisions have similar effects, why should this formal 
distinction matter? If discretion is routinely exercised in the same way, 
then we should be able to predict its consequence. Criminologists Devah 
Pager, Bruce Western, and others have shown that employers generally 
would prefer to hire job applicants without criminal records.35 So, even 
if the employment consequences are contingent on the decisions or 
policies of private actors, it appears that the effects are at least somewhat 
predictable.36 
 
highly probable. See HARRY J. HOLZER, WHAT EMPLOYERS WANT: JOB PROSPECTS FOR LESS-
EDUCATED WORKERS 59–60 (1996); JACOBS, supra note 1, at 279–82 (collecting data on 
employer hiring preferences); Ian B. Petersen, Toward True Fair-Chance Hiring: Balancing 
Stakeholder Interests and Reality in Regulating Criminal Background Checks, 94 TEX. L. REV. 
175, 176–77 (2015); Joan Petersilia, When Prisoners Return to the Community: Political, 
Economic, and Social Consequences 1, 3–4 (Sentencing & Corr. Issues for the 21st Century, No. 
9, 2000). That being said, as I stress throughout the Article, private employers and their 
decisions operate as intervening acts and actors in the chain of causation from conviction to 
unemployment. 
 35 See, e.g., PAGER, supra note 1, at 59–63; Miriam J. Aukerman, The Somewhat Suspect 
Class: Towards a Constitutional Framework for Evaluating Occupational Restrictions Affecting 
People with Criminal Records, 7 J.L. SOC’Y 18, 22–23 (2005) (“For example, one study 
conducted in five major cities showed that two-thirds of employers would not knowingly hire a 
former offender.”); Petersen, supra note 34, at 176–78 (“Employers said they were less likely to 
hire ex-offenders than any other disadvantaged population included in the survey: welfare 
recipients (82% willing to hire), GED holders (82%), applicants who had been unemployed for 
at least one year (68%), and even applicants with only part- or short-time work experience 
(48%).”). 
 36 Indeed, predicting the behavior of private employers is hardly unheard of in public law. 
By way of analogy, in the Social Security context, administrative law judges (ALJs) frequently 
rely on the testimony of “vocational experts.” See, e.g., Banks v. Gonzales, 453 F.3d 449, 454 
(7th Cir. 2006); Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1240 (11th Cir. 2004); Jon C. Dubin, 
Overcoming Gridlock: Campbell After a Quarter-Century and Bureaucratically Rational Gap-
Filling in Mass Justice Adjudication in the Social Security Administration’s Disability Programs, 
62 ADMIN. L. REV. 937, 964–65 (2010). These experts testify as to a disability claimant’s ability 
to perform various jobs and the presence of those jobs in the labor market. See, e.g., Boone v. 
Barnhart, 353 F.3d 203, 205–06 (3d Cir. 2003); Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1100–01 (9th 
Cir. 1999). Whether a claimant receives benefits often depends upon the testimony of the 
vocational expert and her statements about the claimant’s likelihood of being hired by a private 
employer. See, e.g., Smith v. Halter, 307 F.3d 377, 378 (6th Cir. 2001); Dubin, supra at 964–65. 
There are many reasons to be suspicious about ALJs’ reliance on vocational expert testimony. 
See Donahue v. Barnhart, 279 F.3d 441, 446 (7th Cir. 2002) (“We asked the parties at oral 
argument what makes a vocational expert an ‘expert’ (and where the information in the 
Dictionary [of Occupational Titles] came from). They did not know.”); Dubin, supra at 966–68 
(listing problems and noting the “‘emperor’s new clothing’ quality sometimes attendant to 
[vocational expert] qualifications and evidence”). But it is worth noting that this practice of 
examining the private labor market is a staple of the large body of litigation that comprises 
Social Security appeals. ALJs’ decisions and the allocation of benefits depend not on extensive 
social scientific research or legislative fact finding, but on the statements of marginally qualified 
experts. See generally Nathaniel O. Hubley, Note, The Untouchables: Why a Vocational Expert’s 
Testimony in Social Security Disability Hearings Cannot Be Touched, 43 VAL. U. L. REV. 353 
(2008) (critiquing the overreliance on testimony from vocational experts). That is, if such vague 
statements about the labor market provide a sufficient basis to grant or deny federal benefits, 
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If we know that a criminal conviction is likely to render an 
individual unemployable, and if we know that a range of economic 
benefits and social and civil rights are tied to employment, then we 
should be able to identify a set of collateral consequences that are highly 
likely to result from conviction. While the consequences may not be 
mandatory and while they might rest on private decision-makers, they 
are foreseeable. Thus, to the extent that scholars have argued that formal 
collateral consequences should be factored into decisions about 
punishment or sentencing, I argue that informal collateral consequences 
also should be. As the Standards indicate, scholars and attorneys have 
identified a set of tools and institutional reforms that might take 
collateral consequences seriously.37 It is impossible to assess whether 
sentences are too harsh, too lenient, etc. if we do not know the 
parameters of each sentence.38 Probable unemployment, coupled with 
the attendant social and economic problems, might appear 
disproportionate when coupled with lengthy prison sentences or other 
direct effects of conviction (or, in some cases, perhaps not). To the 
extent formal punishment plus informal collateral consequences appear 
disproportionate, they should trigger the sorts of policy proposals and 
inspection that the Standards put forth and scholars of collateral 
consequences have raised. 
Even if criminal employment law were not troubling as excessively 
punitive, though, it still would raise predictability concerns. That is, the 
contingency of criminal employment law in and of itself should be an 
issue. An enormous amount of case law and scholarly literature has 
focused on the role of discretion in sentencing (whether it is properly 
exercised by the judge, the legislator, or the prosecutor; whether 
determinate sentencing schemes yield fairer outcomes; whether 
discretion helps or hurts defendants of color and other marginalized 
groups).39 Regardless of our view on the proper function of discretion in 
 
then why could not engagement with data about private market actors have a role to play at 
sentencing or in the course of determining probation terms or terms of release? 
 37 See generally A.B.A., supra note 4. 
 38 Of course, properly calibrating sentences or punishments would also require a broader 
agreement on the purposes of punishment and what functions criminal law is meant to serve. 
See generally Benjamin Levin, The Consensus Myth in Criminal Justice Reform, 117 MICH. L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2018) (examining competing theories of criminal justice reform and the 
significance of first-principles disagreements). Cf. JOHN F. PFAFF, LOCKED IN: THE TRUE 
CAUSES OF MASS INCARCERATION—AND HOW TO ACHIEVE REAL REFORM 8 (2017) (noting that 
“no one has provided a metric for determining how many people in prison is ‘too many’”). 
Such a discussion of criminal punishment’s proper purpose falls outside the scope of this 
Article. 
 39 See, e.g., Shima Baradaran, Race, Prediction, and Discretion, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 157, 
171 (2013); Robert Heller, Selective Prosecution and the Federalization of Criminal Law: The 
Need for Meaningful Judicial Review of Prosecutorial Discretion, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1309, 1326–
27 (1997); Erik Luna & Marianne Wade, Prosecutors as Judges, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1413, 
1414–15 (2010); Tracey L. Meares, Rewards for Good Behavior: Influencing Prosecutorial 
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determining punishment, it is important to note that private 
employment consequences shift decisions about the treatment of 
individuals with criminal convictions outside of the scope of the 
criminal system altogether.40 Given that the criminal code is a product 
of political decisions by political actors, someone will always be 
exercising some degree of discretion in shaping criminal punishment. 
Should that someone be a private employer? 
Put simply, the conventional treatment of formal collateral 
consequences understates the role that private actors and informal 
consequences play in shaping the lives of individuals with criminal 
records. By focusing on private employers and non-statutory legal 
frameworks, I hope to shine a light on the private decisions and legal 
doctrines that shape the experience of punishment. To this end, the next 
Part lays out the legal framework of “criminal employment law.” 
II.     THE FRAMEWORK OF CRIMINAL EMPLOYMENT LAW 
A wide array of legal and extra-legal institutions shapes the 
interaction between the criminal system and the labor market. For 
individuals arrested, charged, or sentenced, a web of statutes will affect 
their attempts to obtain or retain employment.41 Licensing laws in many 
states bar those convicted of crimes from a range of occupations,42 and 
seven states go so far as to forbid those convicted of a felony from 
holding any public jobs.43 According to the National Inventory of 
 
Discretion and Conduct with Financial Incentives, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 851 (1995); Jed S. 
Rakoff, Why Innocent People Plead Guilty, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Nov. 20, 2014), http://
www.nybooks.com/articles/2014/11/20/why-innocent-people-plead-guilty. 
 40 See infra Section IV.B. 
 41 See JACOBS, supra note 1, at 261; Debbie A. Mukamal & Paul N. Samuels, Statutory 
Limitations on Civil Rights of People with Criminal Records, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1501, 1503–
05 (2003) (describing statutes that specifically address those with arrests rather than 
convictions). 
 42 See Bruce E. May, The Character Component of Occupational Licensing Laws: A 
Continuing Barrier to the Ex-Felon’s Employment Opportunities, 71 N.D. L. Rev. 187, 209–10 
(1995). For example, in New York, a person convicted of any felony may not work in real estate 
sales, see N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 440-a (McKinney 2018), alcohol sales, see N.Y. ALCO. BEV. 
CONT. LAW § 110(d) (McKinney 2018), check cashing, see N.Y. BANKING LAW § 369(6) 
(McKinney 2018), as a firefighter, see N.Y.C., N.Y. ADMIN. CODE § 15-103 (2018), a notary, see 
N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 130 (McKinney 2018), a pier superintendent or hiring agent, see N.Y. 
UNCONSOL. LAW § 9814(b) (McKinney 2018), a private investigator, N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 74 
(McKinney 2018), an insurance adjuster, see N.Y. INS. LAW §§ 2108(d)(3)–(4) (McKinney 
2018). See generally LEGAL ACTION CTR., NEW YORK STATE OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING SURVEY 
(2006), http://lac.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/Occupational-Licensing-Survey-2006.pdf. 
 43 JACOBS, supra note 1, at 261. Other states forbid public employment for individuals with 
felony convictions, but allow for “restoration of eligibility.” Id. Even states that do not contain 
blanket prohibitions on public employment still restrict heavily the employment of those with 
criminal records. See id. Indeed, it is not uncommon for state law to include hundreds of 
statutes and regulations granting public employers the discretion to discharge individuals with 
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Collateral Consequences of Conviction (NICCC) maintained by the 
ABA, 599 federal statutes and regulations restrict employment for those 
with criminal records.44 As of March 2016, eighty-five percent of all the 
statutes and regulations in the NICCC (state and federal) pertain to the 
employment rights of those with criminal records.45 Indeed, looking to 
the employment-related statutes in the broader context of other denials 
of rights and benefits,46 it would be hard to disagree with James Jacobs’s 
characterization of those with criminal records as “second-class citizens 
by law.”47 
Statutory criminal employment law—the web of laws that governs 
public employment and public licensing—is ubiquitous.48 But, in this 
Part, and in this Article generally, I do not want to focus on the 
statutory schemes. These statutes are certainly important. They shape 
the circumstances of reentry and the broad sweep of the criminal 
system. But, while they are hidden punishments, unmentioned at 
sentencing and not written into the criminal laws that define offenses or 
prescribe punishment, they are still more visible than another corner of 
criminal employment law: ostensibly, private “private law”49 doctrines 
of employer liability for employee conduct and employer disciplinary 
systems. These non-statutory institutions play a critical role in the 
broader framework of criminal employment law.50 The use of criminal 
background checks as a prerequisite to employment has expanded 
 
criminal records or banning outright individuals with criminal records from holding specific 
jobs. See Search by Jurisdiction, JUSTICE CTR., https://niccc.csgjusticecenter.org/search/?
jurisdiction (select “Employment” from “Category”) (last visited May. 23, 2018). The numbers 
range from greater than federal restrictions (California has 753) to more modest, but still large 
numbers (Rhode Island has 189). Id. (click “Advanced Search”; select “Employment” from 
“Categories”; select the state from “Jurisdiction”) 
 44 Search by Jurisdiction, supra note 43 (select “Employment” from Category and select 
“Federal” from “Jurisdiction”). Of these 599, 242 are “mandatory” or “automatic.” Id. That is, a 
conviction immediately triggers discharge, failure to hire, or reporting to a superior, rather than 
granting a supervising or hiring official the discretion to make an employment decision. 
 45 See id. 
 46 See, e.g., John Bronsteen et al., Happiness and Punishment, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1037, 1063–
64 (2009); Nora V. Demleitner, Preventing Internal Exile: The Need for Restrictions on 
Collateral Sentencing Consequences, 11 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 153 (1999); Michael Pinard & 
Anthony C. Thompson, Offender Reentry and the Collateral Consequences of Criminal 
Convictions: An Introduction, 30 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 585 (2006); Anthony C. 
Thompson, Navigating the Hidden Obstacles to Ex-Offender Reentry, 45 B.C. L. REV. 255, 279–
82 (2004) (“Although it is tempting to think in isolation about each of the problems reentering 
ex-offenders face, they tend to be linked.”). 
 47 JACOBS, supra note 1, at 249. 
 48 See, e.g., JACOBS, supra note 1, at 261; Mukamal & Samuels, supra note 41; NICCC, supra 
note 5. 
 49 See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
 50 See generally MICHELLE NATIVIDAD RODRIGUEZ & MAURICE EMSELLEM, THE NAT’L EMP. 
LAW PROJECT, 65 MILLION “NEED NOT APPLY”: THE CASE FOR REFORMING CRIMINAL 
BACKGROUND CHECKS FOR EMPLOYMENT (Mar. 2011), http://www.nelp.org/content/uploads/
2015/03/65_Million_Need_Not_Apply.pdf (cataloging the effects of employment 
discrimination against those with criminal records). 
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substantially in the last twenty years,51 and surveys have shown that over 
sixty percent of employers would not knowingly hire people with 
criminal records.52 This means that much of the work of criminal 
employment law operates extra-statutorily. 
There may be legitimate reasons why employers are hesitant to hire 
those with criminal records. But it does not follow that any conviction 
should bar any type of employment, or that the law, employers, or 
consumers are necessarily justified in imposing blanket bans. Further, 
this Article emphasizes that those decisions and those preferences have 
significant social and distributional costs. To the extent that they 
disadvantage certain groups, have criminogenic effects, or are 
undervalued in calibrating punishment, they require our attention. 
As sociologist Bruce Western describes it, the treatment of 
individuals with criminal records, particularly black men, has resulted in 
a process of “social exclusion.”53 This marginalized population “bears 
the stigma of official criminality in all subsequent spheres of social life, 
as citizens, workers, and spouses.”54 According to Western and other 
scholars of reentry, the marginalization is inextricably linked to 
employment and to the labor market—mass incarceration removes 
many people from the labor market directly (via imprisonment) and 
indirectly (via the collateral consequences that follow release).55 “[P]enal 
exclusion has been layered on top of economic and racial exclusion,” 
argues David Garland, “ensuring that social divisions are deepened, and 
that a criminalized underclass is brought into existence and 
systematically perpetuated.”56 That is, the carceral state and the effects of 
 
 51 See Ian B. Petersen, Note, Toward True Fair-Chance Hiring: Balancing Stakeholder 
Interests and Reality in Regulating Criminal Background Checks, 94 TEX. L. REV. 175, 177 (2015) 
(“In 1994, just 48% of surveyed Los Angeles employers always or sometimes checked criminal 
backgrounds; by 2001, this number had risen to 63%. A 2010 national survey showed over 90% 
of employers used criminal background checks in some capacity, and 73% used them for all 
candidates.” (footnote omitted)). 
 52 See PAGER, supra note 1, at 34. 
 53 WESTERN, supra note 7, at 6. See generally JACOBS, supra note 1, at 279–81 (reporting on 
studies that demonstrate that black job applicants with criminal records are less likely to find 
employment than similarly situated white applicants); PAGER, supra note 1 (same). But see 
Amanda Agan & Sonja Starr, Ban the Box, Criminal Records, and Statistical Discrimination: A 
Field Experiment (U. of Mich. Law Sch. Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Paper No. 16-012, 
2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2795795 (finding no relationship 
between race and felony convictions in hiring decisions). 
 54 WESTERN, supra note 7, at 6. 
 55 See id. (“So marginal have these men become, that the most disadvantaged among them 
are hidden from statistics on wages and employment. The economic situation of young black 
men—measured by wage and employment rates—appeared to improve through the economic 
expansion of the 1990s, but this appearance was wholly an artifact of rising incarceration 
rates.”). 
 56 David Garland, Introduction: The Meaning of Mass Imprisonment, in MASS 
IMPRISONMENT: SOCIAL CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 1, 2 (David Garland ed., 2001); see also 
Jonathan Simon & Richard Sparks, Punishment and Society: The Emergence of an Academic 
Field, in THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF PUNISHMENT AND SOCIETY 1, 11 (Jonathan Simon & 
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mass incarceration are embedded in a broader set of economic 
conditions. 
In this Part, and in this Article generally, I will focus on the 
decisions made by employers and the common law doctrines and 
private agreements that structure those decisions in an effort to examine 
the legal architecture of this social and economic exclusion. Specifically, 
this Part first will examine the tort law doctrines of negligent hiring and 
retention, which allow for liability when employers hire or retain 
individuals with criminal records. Next, this Part will discuss the rise of 
employee conduct policies that allow for employers to discipline or 
discharge employees based on criminal investigations, arrests, or 
charges. 
A.     Negligent Hiring and Retention 
In order to understand the place of “private law” in the criminal 
system, it is important to recognize tort law’s role in bringing criminal 
records into the workplace. The doctrines of negligent hiring and 
retention create potentially broad avenues for direct employer liability 
based on the identity and history of employees.57 “These theories of 
recovery impose liability for an employee’s intentional tort, an action 
almost invariably outside the scope of employment,”58 but they do so 
because of an overarching attempt to “address risks created by exposing 
members of the public to a potentially dangerous individual.”59 
Both doctrines rest on the premise that an employer may be 
responsible for the misconduct of her employee even when the 
employee acts outside the scope of her employment. An employer “is 
under a duty to exercise reasonable care so to control his [employee] 
while acting outside the scope of his employment as to prevent him 
from intentionally harming others or from so conducting himself as to 
create an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to them” if the conduct 
satisfies four elements—the employee: (1) “is upon the premises in 
possession of the [employer] or upon which the [employee] is privileged 
to enter only as his [employee],” or (2) “is using a chattel of the master,” 
and the employer: (3) “knows or has reason to know that he has the 
ability to control his [employee],” and (4) “knows or should know of the 
necessity and opportunity for exercising such control.”60 Specifically, in 
 
Richard Sparks eds., 2013) (describing this view of incarceration as social control). 
 57 See, e.g., Connes v. Molalla Transp. Sys., 831 P.2d 1316, 1320–21 (Colo. 1992); Plains 
Res., Inc. v. Gable, 682 P.2d 653, 662 (Kan. 1984); Di Cosala v. Kay, 450 A.2d 508, 515 (N.J. 
1982). 
 58 Yunker v. Honeywell, Inc., 496 N.W.2d 419, 422 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993). 
 59 Id. (citing Di Cosala, 450 A.2d at 515). 
 60 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 317 (AM. LAW INST. 1965); see also Ehrens v. 
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the context of negligent retention, an employer may be liable for 
“retaining in his employment [employees] who, to his knowledge, are in 
the habit of misconducting themselves in a manner dangerous to others. 
This is true although he has without success made every other effort to 
prevent their misconduct by the exercise of his authority as 
[employer].”61 
In negligent hiring and retention cases, therefore, courts focus on 
the “propensities” of the employees.62 For this reason, the doctrines 
remain distinct from general principles of respondeat superior.63 As the 
Supreme Court of New Jersey has explained: 
[T]he tort of negligent hiring addresses the risk created by exposing 
members of the public to a potentially dangerous individual, while 
the doctrine of respondeat superior is based on the theory that the 
employee is the agent or is acting for the employer. Therefore the 
scope of employment limitation on liability which is a part of the 
respondeat superior doctrine is not implicit in the wrong of negligent 
hiring.64 
That is, an employer’s liability for her employee’s tortious conduct 
within the scope of employment is not predicated on the employer’s 
knowledge of the employee’s character, background, or predilections 
outside of work. Respondeat superior liability’s focus is on the 
workplace itself and the manner in which an employee does her job, or 
the way in which an employer trains and supervises her employee. 
Negligent hiring and retention, on the other hand, base liability on an 
employee’s identity and the sufficiency of her employer’s efforts to suss 
out past misdeeds or misconduct.65 
 
Lutheran Church, 385 F.3d 232, 235 (2d Cir. 2004) (articulating the elements under New York 
law); Stalbosky v. Belew, 205 F.3d 890, 894, 896 (6th Cir. 2000) (stating the elements under 
Kentucky law). For purposes of clarity and consistency, I have replaced the “master/servant” 
formulation with “employer/employee.” While these two different sets of legal classifications 
are not coterminous, the differences are not applicable to this discussion. 
 61 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 317 cmt. c. The Restatement specifies that “[t]here 
may be circumstances in which the only effective control which the master can exercise over 
the conduct of his servant is to discharge the servant.” Id. 
 62 See, e.g., Mercado v. City of Orlando, 407 F.3d 1152, 1162 (11th Cir. 2005) (“To state a 
claim of negligent retention of employees, Mercado must show that Orlando was put on notice 
of the harmful propensities of the employees.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation 
omitted)); C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High Sch. Dist., 270 P.3d 699, 702 (Cal. 2012) 
(discussing a school counselor’s alleged “propensities” for predatory conduct that might put his 
employer on notice that he was a potential sex offender); Munroe v. Universal Health Servs., 
Inc., 596 S.E.2d 604, 606 (Ga. 2004); Ponticas v. K.M.S. Invs., 331 N.W.2d 907, 911 (Minn. 
1983) (“Liability is predicated on the negligence of an employer in placing a person with known 
propensities, or propensities which should have been discovered by reasonable 
investigation . . . .”). 
 63 See JACOBS, supra note 1, at 73. 
 64 Di Cosala, 450 A.2d at 515. 
 65 See, e.g., Marquis v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 961 P.2d 1213, 1224–25 (Kan. 1998) 
(collecting cases); J. v. Victory Tabernacle Baptist Church, 372 S.E.2d 391, 394 (Va. 1988). 
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Criminal records naturally come into this analysis when courts 
examine knowledge and foreseeability66—i.e., whether an employer 
knew of the employee’s propensity for bad behavior and whether the 
resulting harm to third parties was foreseeable.67 Whether an employer 
knew or should have known of an employee’s propensity for 
misfeasance might rest on whether a background check had been 
conducted (and how thorough that check was).68 Similarly, whether the 
ultimate tortious conduct and injury were foreseeable might turn on the 
nature of any past arrests or convictions.69 That is, a criminal history 
need not render future misconduct foreseeable if the past offense differs 
substantially from the ultimate tortious or criminal conduct.70 
While courts consistently have held that failure to perform a 
criminal background check does not amount to negligence per se,71 
courts frequently treat an employer’s decision to conduct a background 
check as evidence of due diligence.72 And, an employer’s failure to 
conduct a background check or failure to investigate suspicious conduct 
or gaps in a resume may weigh against an employer and create a triable 
issue of fact for the jury.73 Indeed, as a practical matter, given the 
significant rise in employment-related background checks and 
technological advances in access to records that make retrieval less 
 
 66 While the existence of a duty to the plaintiff frequently is also at issue in negligent hiring 
and retention suits, see Di Cosala, 450 A.2d at 516, this inquiry is not relevant to this Article’s 
focus on criminal records. 
 67 See, e.g., D.R.R. v. English Enters., Catv, 356 N.W.2d 580, 583 (Iowa Ct. App. 1984); 
Hersh v. Kentfield Builders, Inc., 189 N.W.2d 286, 288 (Mich. 1971); Se. Apartments Mgmt., 
Inc. v. Jackman, 513 S.E.2d 395, 397 (Va. 1999); Timothy L. Creed, Negligent Hiring and 
Criminal Rehabilitation: Employing Ex-Convicts, Yet Avoiding Liability, 20 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 
183, 188 (2008); Hickox, supra note 14, at 1007–08 (collecting cases). 
 68 See, e.g., Keen v. Miller Envtl. Grp., Inc., 702 F.3d 239, 246 (5th Cir. 2012); Blair v. Def. 
Servs., Inc., 386 F.3d 623, 629 (4th Cir. 2004); Jackman, 513 S.E.2d at 397; Welsh Mfg. v. 
Pinkerton’s, Inc., 474 A.2d 436, 442 (R.I. 1984). 
 69 See, e.g., Muegge v. Heritage Oaks Golf & Country Club, Inc., 209 F. App’x 936, 941 (11th 
Cir. 2006); Van Horne v. Muller, 705 N.E.2d 898, 905 (Ill. 1998) (collecting cases); Carlsen v. 
Wackenhut Corp., 868 P.2d 882, 888 (Wash. Ct. App.1994). 
 70 See, e.g., Van Osdol v. Vogt, 908 P.2d 1122, 1132 n.17 (Colo. 1996); McCann v. Varrick 
Grp. L.L.C., 84 A.D.3d 591, 591–92 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011). 
 71 See Keen, 702 F.3d at 246 n.4 (collecting cases). But see Vaughan v. Harrah’s Las Vegas, 
Inc., No. 46821, 2008 WL 6124455, at *5 (Nev. July 7, 2008) (“The tort of negligent hiring 
imposes a general duty on an employer to conduct a reasonable background check on a 
potential employee to ensure that he or she is suitable for the position.” (internal quotation 
marks omitted) (citation omitted)). 
 72 See, e.g., Blair, 386 F.3d at 632–33 (Widener, J., dissenting); Estevez-Yalcin v. Children’s 
Vill., 331 F. Supp. 2d 170, 173 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); Dewitt v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., No. 10-CV-
3319 KAM, 2012 WL 4049805, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2012); Pinkerton’s, Inc., 474 A.2d at 
442. 
 73 See, e.g., Peterson v. RTM Mid-Am., Inc., 434 S.E.2d 521, 523 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993); Foster 
v. Loft, Inc., 526 N.E.2d 1309, 1311 (Mass. App. Ct. 1988); Megan Oswald, Comment & 
Casenote, Private Employers or Private Investigators? A Comment on Negligently Hiring 
Applicants with Criminal Records in Ohio, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 1771, 1780–81 (2004) (collecting 
cases). 
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costly and time consuming,74 it would not be unreasonable to conclude 
that a risk-averse employer would make a criminal background check a 
prerequisite for any range of jobs.75 
That being said, while courts may focus on the presence or absence 
of a background check, it is unclear what criminal records actually tell 
us about the foreseeability of future harm (or, for that matter, an 
employee’s propensity for tortious or criminal conduct). As an 
empirical matter, the probative value of criminal records in assessing 
future offending remains a point of some scholarly uncertainty.76 For 
example, in a 2009 study, Alfred Blumstein and Kiminori Nakamura 
found that the predictive weight of a past conviction diminishes 
significantly over time.77 Using data from New Yorkers arrested in 1980 
for robbery, burglary, and aggravated assault,78 Blumstein and 
Nakamura found that the “hazard rate” (i.e., the risk of re-arrest)79 
declined rapidly after the initial conviction.80 For the bulk of the subjects 
of the study, within five years, the hazard rate had dropped to the 
normal rate for record-less New Yorkers of the same age.81 Further, to 
the extent rehabilitation retains any purchase as a justification for 
criminal punishment, treating past misconduct as evidence of future 
wrongdoing is deeply troubling. In other words, the logic of 
 
 74 See, e.g., JACOBS, supra note 1, at 281; Love, supra note 4, at 251; Ben Geiger, Comment, 
The Case for Treating Ex-Offenders as a Suspect Class, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1191, 1198–99 (2006). 
 75 The practical ease of conducting background checks might be relevant to the liability 
calculus given some courts focus on other factors such as “the social utility of the defendant’s 
conduct, the magnitude of the burden of guarding against the harm caused to the plaintiff, the 
practical consequences of placing such a burden on the defendant, and any additional elements 
disclosed by the particular circumstances of the case.” Connes v. Molalla Transp. Sys., Inc., 831 
P.2d 1316, 1320 (Colo. 1992). 
 76 Compare J.C. Oleson, Risk in Sentencing: Constitutionally Suspect Variables and 
Evidence-Based Sentencing, 64 SMU L. REV. 1329, 1356 (2011) (“The U.S. Sentencing 
Commission has suggested that the criminal history categories of the sentencing guidelines, 
which categorize offenders by frequency, seriousness, and recency of prior offenses, are highly 
predictive of future recidivism.”), with Paul H. Robinson, The Ongoing Revolution in 
Punishment Theory: Doing Justice as Controlling Crime, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1089, 1101 (2011) 
(“Unfortunately, criminal history is a significantly less accurate predictor of future criminality 
than would be a direct clinical assessment of a person’s dangerousness.”). 
 77 See Alfred Blumstein & Kiminori Nakamura, Redemption in the Presence of Widespread 
Criminal Background Checks, 47 CRIMINOLOGY 327, 349–50 (2009); see also Doe v. United 
States, 110 F. Supp. 3d 448, 455 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (“That [the party seeking expungement] has 
not engaged in any criminal activity since the conduct that brought her before me helps to 
prove that point; a long period of law-abiding conduct after a conviction lowers the risk of 
recidivism to the same level as someone who has never committed a crime.”). 
 78 Blumstein & Nakamura, supra note 77, at 335. 
 79 It is worth noting that re-arrest may not be an accurate indication of recidivism and may 
be both over- and under-inclusive. Further, given what we know about the ways in which 
criminal enforcement tends to be targeted most heavily in marginalized communities, there is 
reason to be suspicious that re-arrest might track a defendant’s identity as much as (if not more 
than) her criminal conduct. 
 80 See Blumstein & Nakamura, supra note 77, at 338–46. 
 81 See id. at 339. 
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rehabilitation fails if people who have served their sentence continue to 
be treated as dangerous or suspect.82 Nevertheless, despite these flaws, 
courts continue to use criminal history as a proxy for risk. 
Before moving on to address employee conduct policies, it is worth 
pausing to note the significance of negligent hiring and retention in the 
body of criminal employment law. While these tort doctrines initially 
might not seem as imposing as the statutory components of criminal 
employment law, it would be a mistake to understate their significance 
in shaping employer preferences and restricting the job market for 
people with convictions. A 2001 study found that employers had lost 
seventy-two percent of negligent hiring cases that went to trial.83 
Average pre-trial settlement amounts of the studied cases topped $1.6 
million.84 Therefore, employers face significant financial incentives to 
avoid hiring those with criminal records, or at least to be very careful in 
assessing the criminal histories of any applicants.85 Even for industries 
or occupations where no statutory or regulatory diktat bars employing 
people with criminal records, the specter of costly civil litigation might 
make discriminating against those with criminal records a “rational” 
decision for many employers.86 
 
 82 Indeed, this logical flaw permeates the broader realm of collateral consequences. If an 
individual has served her sentence or received her punishment, what justification is there for 
her to continue to suffer? If the answer is that her conviction indicates that she remains a 
danger to society, then either that means a rejection of the rehabilitative idea or a belief that the 
mode (or severity) of punishment has failed to advance rehabilitative ends. Alternatively, the 
answer might be that she has lost certain rights, privileges, or status as a result of her having 
violated community norms. But, that justification sounds a lot like an argument that collateral 
consequences are punishment. 
 83 Holzer et al., supra note 6, at 207. 
 84 Id. 
 85 See id. (“The high probability of losing such a [negligent hiring or retention] suit coupled 
with the magnitude of settlement awards suggest that fear of litigation may substantially deter 
employers from hiring applicants with criminal history records.”). 
 86 See infra text accompanying notes 184–85 (discussing and critiquing the role of “rational 
discrimination” as a driver of collateral consequences in the labor market). The presence of 
varying state tort doctrines coupled with the occupational licensing restrictions at the state and 
local level further increases the likelihood that employers will over-correct or adopt the most 
risk-averse approach to hiring and retentions. If a company does business in multiple 
jurisdictions (or employs workers to perform a range of functions), it is not out of the question 
that the company might employ ex-offenders in one jurisdiction (or for one function) with 
impunity, but that doing so elsewhere would expose them to liability. While such nuance and 
variation might be products of different community attitudes toward rehabilitation, employers 
might respond by taking the most risk-averse approach and adopting a general hiring policy 
that conforms to the most restrictive jurisdiction’s approach to tort liability or licensing. Cf. 
Monique C. Lillard, Their Servants’ Keepers: Examining Employer Liability for the Crimes and 
Bad Acts of Employees, 43 IDAHO L. REV. 709, 745 (2007) (“Employers, like most potential 
defendants, are cautious and tend to overprotect themselves.”). 
2018] C RI MIN A L E MP LO Y ME N T  LA W  2285 
B.     Employee Conduct Policies 
Where the tort doctrines provide employer liability, employee 
conduct policies or handbooks do not necessarily give rise to liability; 
instead, they shape the contractual relationship between employer 
and employee.87 “Most state courts have found that an employee 
handbook or other policy statement can create an enforceable 
contract between employer and employee.”88 In cases where 
employers (private or public) have contracted out of the traditional 
“at-will” employment, they occasionally take advantage of conduct 
policies to restrict or further define the behavior that they expect of 
their employees.89 These policies operate as internal rules or 
constraints on employees, granting rights to employers to discipline 
workers based on misconduct.90 In some cases, these policies operate 
as a version of “morals clauses”—contractual terms that allow for 
discharge or discipline if an employee acts in such a way as to 
compromise the image or moral standing of the employer.91 Such 
contracts have a long history in the entertainment and education 
industries, where consumers and students, respectively, are assumed to 
be particularly responsive to the character and identity of the employee 
(i.e., the actor or teacher).92 
Perhaps the most publicly visible form of the policies in the current 
labor market has been the proliferation of player conduct policies in the 
professional sports context.93 In the wake of highly publicized off-field 
 
 87 See 2 HR SERIES POLICIES AND PRACTICES § 126:25 (rev. ed. May 2018) [hereinafter HR 
SERIES]. 
 88 Id.; see also Wooley v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 491 A.2d 1257 (N.J. 1985), modified, 
499 A.2d 515 (N.J. 1985). But see Elmore v. Cleary, 399 F.3d 279, 280 n.1 (3d Cir. 2005) (noting 
that such an agreement need not serve as a contract). 
 89 See HR SERIES, supra note 87, § 126:25. That said, employment conduct policies are not 
found exclusively in unionized shops. 
 90 See, e.g., Dana H. Freyer, Corporate Compliance Programs for FDA-Regulated Companies: 
Incentives for Their Development and the Impact of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines for 
Organizations, 51 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 225, 236 n.71 (1996); About: 665 Postal Service Standards 
of Conduct, U.S. POSTAL SERV. [hereinafter USPS], https://about.usps.com/manuals/elm/html/
elmc6_024.htm. 
 91 See, e.g., RKO Radio Pictures, Inc. v. Jarrico, 274 P.2d 928, 929 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1954) 
(“[A]ppellant agreed that during the production and distribution of the motion picture he 
would conduct himself with due regard to public conventions and morals and would not do 
anything which would tend to degrade him or bring him into public disgrace, obloquy, ill will 
or ridicule.”); Marka B. Fleming et al., Morals Clauses for Educators in Secondary and 
Postsecondary Schools: Legal Applications and Constitutional Concerns, 2009 B.Y.U. EDUC. & 
L.J. 67, 67–68 (2009) (“In general, morals clauses in employment contracts allow an employer 
to terminate employment when an employee’s conduct is potentially detrimental to the 
employer’s interest.”); Noah B. Kressler, Using the Morals Clause in Talent Agreements: A 
Historical, Legal and Practical Guide, 29 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 235, 235–36 (2005). 
 92 See Fleming, et al., supra note 91, at 67–68; Kressler, supra note 91, at 235–36. 
  93 See, e.g., Chris Deubert et al., All Four Quarters: A Retrospective and Analysis of the 2011 
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and off-court incidents, the National Football League (NFL) and 
National Basketball League (NBA) have implemented conduct policies 
that govern the behavior of their players at all times.94 These policies 
allow the league commissioners to discipline players who are arrested 
for or convicted of crimes.95 For purposes of this Article, it is critical to 
note that this misconduct need not take place at work or be directly tied 
to workplace safety.96 Instead, in some cases, the employer may exercise 
authority to fire or discipline an employee based on actual or alleged 
misconduct that has occurred when a worker is “off the clock” and 
conducting personal business.97 In one highly publicized incident, NFL 
 
Collective Bargaining Process and Agreement in the National Football League, 19 UCLA ENT. L. 
REV. 1, 63 (2012); Marc Edelman, Speech: A Different Look at Compliance in Professional Sports: 
Why the NFL Personal Conduct Policy Might Be More Illegal Than the Very Conduct It Seeks to 
Regulate, 7 DEPAUL J. SPORTS L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 89, 90 (2011); Michael A. Mahone, Jr., 
Note, Sentencing Guidelines for the Court of Public Opinion: An Analysis of the National 
Football League’s Revised Personal Conduct Policy, 11 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 181, 183–84 
(2008); Adam B. Marks, Note, Personnel Foul on the National Football League Players 
Association: How Union Executive Director Gene Upshaw Failed the Union’s Members By Not 
Fighting the Enactment of the Personal Conduct Policy, 40 CONN. L. REV. 1581, 1583 (2008); J.J. 
Adande, Can Silver Fix NBA’s Off-Court Issues?, ESPN (Sept. 4, 2013), http://espn.go.com/nba/
story/_/id/9634662/nba-adam-silver-nba-court-conduct; William C. Rhoden, Principal Goodell 
Sets a New Tone for the N.F.L., N.Y. TIMES (June 2, 2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/
02/sports/football/02rhoden.html?mtrref=www.google.com&gwh=C41C19332247371352
D4642653B04331&gwt=pay (describing NFL commissioner Roger Goodell as a “law and order 
commissioner” due to his focus on off-field issues). 
 94 See generally Mahone, Jr., supra note 93; Adande, supra note 93. 
 95 See generally Kim & Parlow, supra note 15. 
 96 See NAT’L BASKETBALL ASS’N, CONSTITUTION AND BY-LAWS OF THE NATIONAL 
BASKETBALL ASSOCIATION 45 (May 29, 2012), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/files/221035054-
nba-constitution-and-by-laws.pdf (granting the commissioner the power to fine or suspend a 
player who “shall have been guilty of conduct that does not conform to standards of morality or 
fair play, that does not comply at all times with all federal, state, and local laws, or that is 
prejudicial or detrimental to the Association”); see also HR SERIES, supra note 87, § 126:25 (“If 
employers wish to hold employees accountable for their actions while they are away from work, 
that rule should be clearly set forth in the employee practices and procedures and 
communicated to employees. Conduct away from work should be subject to employer scrutiny 
only if the conduct has a clear nexus to the employer’s business. For example, a bank should 
probably discharge any employee convicted of theft. A children’s television host might be 
disciplined or discharged for a DUI.”); USPS, supra note 90 (“Employees are expected to 
conduct themselves during and outside of working hours in a manner that reflects favorably 
upon the Postal Service. Although it is not the policy of the Postal Service to interfere with the 
private lives of employees, it does require that postal employees be honest, reliable, trustworthy, 
courteous, and of good character and reputation. The Federal Standards of Ethical Conduct 
referenced in 662.1 also contain regulations governing the off–duty behavior of postal 
employees. Employees must not engage in criminal, dishonest, notoriously disgraceful, 
immoral, or other conduct prejudicial to the Postal Service. Conviction for a violation of any 
criminal statute may be grounds for disciplinary action against an employee, including removal 
of the employee, in addition to any other penalty imposed pursuant to statute.”). But see 
Conduct: Employee Conduct and Work Rules Policy, SOC’Y HUMAN RES. MGMT. (June 30, 2014), 
http://www.shrm.org/templatestools/samples/policies/pages/cms_006651.aspx (providing a 
sample conduct policy that emphasizes behavior at the workplace and enumerates a list of 
unacceptable behavior, including possession and distribution of narcotics and weapons). 
 97 See, e.g., Terry L. Leap, When Can You Fire for Off-Duty Conduct?, HARV. BUS. REV., Jan. 
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Commissioner Roger Goodell initially suspended Ray Rice of the 
Baltimore Ravens for two games for allegedly assaulting his fiancée, 
Janay Palmer.98 After a video surfaced that showed Rice knocking 
Palmer unconscious, public outcry caused Goodell to attempt to 
increase the punishment for Rice indefinitely and declare that domestic 
violence incidents would receive harsher treatment going forward.99 Put 
simply, the public demanded a response beyond what the criminal 
system offered,100 and Goodell—as a voice of the NFL owners—was able 
to mete out that punishment.101 There are numerous reasons why the 
world of professional sports is not representative of the U.S. labor 
market, but the Rice case nonetheless should serve as a useful 
illustration of a conduct policy’s application.102 
 
1988, at 28. 
 98 See Jill Martin & Steve Almsay, Ray Rice Wins Suspension Appeal, CNN (Nov. 30, 2014, 
12:59 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/11/28/us/ray-rice-reinstated. 
 99 See id. 
 100 See Withers, supra note 15 at 149–50; Post, supra note 15. 
 101 While earlier player conduct policies and disciplinary actions focused on drugs, alcohol, 
and the specter of other criminal misconduct, recent disciplinary actions and public reactions 
often have focused on intimate partner violence and have taken on the language of gender 
justice. See, e.g., Dan Gunderman, Former Pro Bowler Greg Hardy Vying for NFL Return, Says 
He’s ‘Not a Psychopath’, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (May 2, 2017, 3:15 PM), http://
www.nydailynews.com/sports/football/pro-bowler-greg-hardy-vying-nfl-return-article-
1.3130469 (cataloging cases of NFL discipline in domestic violence cases); Robert Salonga, 49ers 
Star Reuben Foster Charged with 3 Felonies in Domestic Violence Case, MERCURY NEWS (Apr. 
12, 2008, 4:42 AM), https://www.mercurynews.com/2018/04/13/49ers-star-reuben-foster-
charged-in-domestic-violence-and-weapon-case-2-2-2 (same). The past year has seen a 
dramatic rise in public attention to issues of gender justice in the workplace with the rise of the 
#MeToo movement. Unlike many of the cases addressed in this Article, much of the conduct 
addressed by #MeToo activists took place in workplaces or was more explicitly related to the 
workplace or employer/employee power dynamics. Nevertheless, as of the time of this Article’s 
publication, the legal and policy responses to #MeToo still are unknown. It is conceivable that 
we might see some interaction between the #MeToo activism and criminal employment law, 
but, as of now, that remains an open question. 
 102 Four elements of major league professional sports in the United States render them 
largely unrepresentative of the labor market at large: (1) the high salary and prestige associated 
with players’ participation; (2) the degree of publicity that the players and their actions receive; 
(3) the degree of skill required to participate; and (4) the power of unions. Cf. Benjamin Levin, 
Blue-Collar Crime: Conspiracy, Organized Labor, and the Anti-Union Civil Rico Claim, 75 ALB. 
L. REV. 559, 628 (2012) (examining the exceptional nature of labor and employment law in the 
sports and entertainment context). In their treatment of professional sports discipline, Janine 
Kim and Matthew Parlow highlight the publicity point as a key component of employee 
discipline in professional sports. See Kim & Parlow, supra note 15, at 575–79. While I will 
return to the publicity point, it is worth noting that the other factors (and, perhaps to a lesser 
extent, even the publicity factor) all speak to the bargaining power or relative market power of 
the employees. That is, one of the reasons that I think we should be concerned about criminal 
employment law is the power imbalance in the market and the ways in which those with 
criminal records, particularly low-income individuals, people of color, and others from 
marginalized communities face even greater challenges in the labor market due to their 
criminal status. See generally PAGER, supra note 1 (finding that black job applicants with 
criminal records faced greater discrimination than white applicants with criminal records). 
Therefore, while the professional sports context may serve as a useful way to understand and 
illustrate the public/private dimensions of criminal employment law, the Rice case and other 
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These personnel or employee conduct policies have received less 
scholarly attention than negligent hiring and retention. And, aside from 
the sports context, they have received limited public attention. Indeed, it 
is difficult to determine how ubiquitous they are.103 But, I think it is fair 
to treat them as closely related to the tort doctrines discussed above and 
as a piece in the broader criminal employment law puzzle. Employee 
conduct policies function as part of a legal regime in which employers 
are often viewed as responsible for the actions and characters of their 
employees. The tort law doctrines discussed in the previous Section rest 
on this view of the employment relationship, so it should not be much 
of a reach to consider those doctrines as closely related to a set of private 
orderings that re-inscribe and delineate the terms of that employment 
relationship. Viewed in this light, the policies might serve one of several 
functions for employers. 
First, they might operate as a means of shielding employers from 
liability under theories of negligent hiring and retention (or other 
analogous tort or statutory theories of liability). If an employer includes 
a specific term forbidding her employee from acting criminally (or 
perhaps even being arrested), and if the employer monitors her 
employee and disciplines based on breach of the policy’s terms, then 
perhaps she might be able to defend against suits arising from the 
employee’s misconduct.104 In other words, an employer is “putting in 
writing” its commitment to preventing employee misconduct, 
preemptively going on record to disapprove of conduct by an employee 
 
cases that have been the focus of other articles about employee conduct policies may well 
distract from the underlying structural considerations that make criminal employment law so 
worrying. Nevertheless, it would be wrong to disregard these cases and this context altogether 
as: (1) professional sports are highly publicized, meaning that the rules, social institutions, and 
legal orders that shape them stand a greater chance of entering the public consciousness, see 
generally Levin, supra note at 568–72 (advocating a focus on the cultural awareness of legal 
rules and norms); and (2) if a market defined by such a powerful group of employees still 
displays such grants of power to employers, there is good reason to assume that such dynamics 
might be even more pronounced in other markets—such as those for low-wage, unskilled 
labor—where employee bargaining power is lacking. 
 103 A number of obstacles stand in the way of determining how widespread these policies are 
and what conduct they reach. Primarily, unlike the licensing statutes discussed above, see supra 
text accompanying notes 41–48, private employment contracts, employee manuals, and 
personal conduct policies are not necessarily parts of the public record. While references to 
employee conduct policies and their terms appear in judicial opinions, see, e.g., Elmore v. 
Cleary, 399 F.3d 279, 280 (3d Cir. 2005); Morris v. Collis Foods, Inc., No. W2001-00918-COA-
R3CV, 2002 WL 1349514, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 19, 2002), these passing mentions or 
discussions of specific provisions provide only a fleeting glance at the legal landscape. 
 104 See HR SERIES, supra note 87, § 126:25. Because respondeat superior liability rests on an 
employee acting within the scope of her employee when she acts tortiously, see Lev v. Beverly 
Enterprises-Mass., Inc., 929 N.E.2d 303, 308 (Mass. 2010), closely circumscribing the scope of 
employment would aid an employer in defending against tort suits relying on such a theory. 
However, tort liability for negligent hiring does not always require a finding that an employee 
acted within the scope of her employment. See Di Cosala v. Kay, 450 A.2d 508, 515 (N.J. 1982). 
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that might otherwise expose the employer to liability.105 Therefore, the 
policies might function as a natural outgrowth of negligent 
hiring/retention theories and, perhaps more broadly, respondeat 
superior liability.106 
Second, and perhaps relatedly, the policies might serve as a sort of 
public relations or cultural framing strategy for employers.107 
Particularly in response to public perception of lawlessness or 
callousness on the part of an employer or an industry, such policies can 
signal awareness and engagement.108 That is, the presence (and perhaps 
the publicizing) of such policies might signal to consumers or clients 
that the employer takes her social responsibility seriously. An employer 
does not want “criminals” on her payroll, and she cares about more than 
the bottom line—or, at least, so the policy signals. 109 Rather than 
waiting for the state to take criminal action or allowing the state to 
define the terms of punishment, the employer is signaling that she is 
willing to impose her own moral condemnation.110 
This explanation finds particular purchase in the professional 
sports context, where public outcry about players’ actions off the court 
have prompted league commissioners to draft and aggressively enforce 
 
 105 But see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 317 cmt. c. (AM. LAW INST. 1965) (“[A] 
railroad company which knows that the crews of its coal trains are in the habit of throwing coal 
from the cars as they pass along tracks laid through a city street, to the danger of travelers, is 
subject to liability if it retains the delinquents in its employment, although it has promulgated 
rules strictly forbidding such practices.” (emphasis added)). 
 106 But cf. Di Cosala, 450 A.2d at 515 (clarifying the different legal standard for respondeat 
superior and negligent hiring claims). 
 107 See Joel Bakan, The Invisible Hand of Law: Private Regulation and the Rule of Law, 48 
CORNELL INT’L L.J. 279, 291 (2015) (“Construction of that conscience has been underway in the 
form of corporate social responsibility (CSR) since the 1980s, when private regulation first 
emerged. Today, CSR is mainstream, a mantra for business leaders, a ubiquitous presence in 
marketing and public relations campaigns, and an organizing principle for earnest gatherings of 
NGOs, scholars, business leaders, and government officials.” (footnote omitted)). 
 108 See Elizabeth F. Brown, No Good Deed Goes Unpunished: Is There a Need for a Safe 
Harbor for Aspirational Corporate Codes of Conduct?, 26 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 367, 373–77 
(2008); Karen Bradshaw Schulz, New Governance and Industry Culture, 88 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 2515, 2521 (2013) (“A key dispute about corporate social responsibility is whether firms’ 
practices meaningfully increase social welfare or merely provide an illusion that firms are good 
citizens.”). 
 109 Cf. Miriam A. Cherry & Judd F. Sneirson, Beyond Profit: Rethinking Corporate Social 
Responsibility and Greenwashing After the BP Oil Disaster, 85 TUL. L. REV. 983, 985 (2011) 
(“Part of the problem [with the legal and social treatment of BP] lies in what some term 
‘greenwashing’ and what we dub ‘faux [corporate social responsibility].’ By greenwashing, a 
corporation might increase its sales or boost its brand image through environmental rhetoric, 
but at the same time either pollute the environment or decline to spend money on the 
environment, employee welfare, or otherwise honor its commitments to other constituencies.”). 
 110 This framing or justification for conduct policies jibes with public preferences for “tough 
on crime” policies and with public assumptions about the guilt of those arrested for or charged 
with crimes. See generally Benjamin Levin, De-Naturalizing Criminal Law: Of Public 
Perceptions and Procedural Protections, 76 ALB. L. REV. 1777, 1777–79 (2013) (describing and 
critiquing this cultural perception of the criminal system). 
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“player conduct policies” that allow for fines, suspensions, and all-out 
bans based on convictions, arrests, and—in some cases—even 
investigations.111 In these situations, sports fans or commentators would 
have had no basis to pursue legal action—by allowing Rice to continue 
playing in the NFL, Goodell would not have harmed viewers or NFL 
fans.112 Therefore, it seems much more plausible that the policies reflect 
a strategy of public presentation, rather than an effort to avoid 
liability.113 It is worth noting that the sports context is unusual in the 
degree of publicity that the policies receive—crafting an employee 
conduct policy for public relations purposes would not make much of 
an impact if consumers were unaware of the policy (or of the underlying 
misconduct).114 Nevertheless, viewed through the broader lens of 
corporate social responsibility, any attempt to craft an employer-
sanctioned moral, ethical, or behavioral code might reflect an attempt at 
crafting an image of a good corporate citizen. Such an image might 
render an employer’s business more profitable or might even help to 
shield the employer from external regulation or suit.115 
Finally, and perhaps most straightforwardly, we might view these 
policies as an attempt to establish greater employer control over 
employees. After all, whether these policies are merely aspirational or 
whether they are enforced actively, they purport to set the parameters of 
employee conduct and set up employers to police those boundaries. As a 
general matter, employers presumably wish to control the behavior of 
their employees to the extent possible.116 And, to the extent that the law 
 
 111 See supra text accompanying notes 93–94. 
 112 See supra text accompanying notes 98–102. Any harm to the NFL would be of an 
intangible and not legally cognizable variety (i.e., something like “damage to the integrity of the 
game”). Perhaps rewarding individuals who behave badly with lucrative contracts, publicity, 
and highly desirable jobs might do some harm to society writ large. But, again, this harm 
sounds much more in the language of the public psyche, collective, consciousness, or some 
other, non-legally cognizable theory of harm. 
 113 It is certainly true that the motivation need not be exclusively one or the other and that 
an intent to improve public relations might be complementary to or a part of a broader effort to 
avoid liability. 
 114 See supra note 102; see also Kim & Parlow, supra note 15; Post, supra note 15 (“I 
understand that perhaps the NFL is a special case, because it is in the entertainment business, 
and has to be particularly sensitive to public opinion and to be sure that its product meets with 
the public’s approval, so it needs to take the law into its own hands for reasons not applicable to 
other private firms.”). 
 115 See, e.g., Bakan, supra note 107, at 291; Ronen Shamir, Socially Responsible Private 
Regulation: World-Culture or World-Capitalism?, 45 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 313, 314 (2011) (“CSR 
was transformed from being associated mainly with displays of good ‘corporate citizenship’ to a 
scientifically validated form of corporate risk management and, more generally, into a 
perceived commercial asset.”). 
 116 See Jeffrey M. Hirsch, Labor Law Obstacles to the Collective Negotiation and 
Implementation of Employee Stock Ownership Plans: A Response to Henry Hansmann and Other 
“Survivalists”, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 957, 984–85 (1998) (“Employers or managers often will 
seek to protect their managerial power by resisting employee ownership plans involving 
employee control. . . . Employers, and particularly managers, may, therefore, resist attempts to 
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allows for—and may even encourage—such control,117 why wouldn’t 
employers try to exert it? This rationale might be a close relative of the 
first two justifications: (1) the law assumes that employers “control” 
their employees, so it is in an employer’s best interest to exercise this 
control fully if she might ultimately be liable for her employee’s 
conduct118 and (2) consumers and the public at large might view the 
conduct of employees as having the tacit approval of their employer.119 
If that is the case, then it seems only logical that an employer would try 
to shape this conduct in any way possible. 
Ultimately, the three justifications for employee conduct policies 
appear to overlap significantly. Each finds some basis in an underlying 
assumption that it is the place of the employer to control the activities of 
her employee. Or, perhaps more broadly, each relies on a belief that an 
employer is the actor or institution (rather than, or in addition to, the 
state) that ought to discipline individuals who behave badly.120 Whether 
the exercise of control is responsive to a descriptive recognition of the 
legal lay of the land or a normative response to public demands depends 
on which rationale we view as the primary driver of these policies. 
Regardless of what is actually motivating each individual employer, 
it is important to recognize the potential significance of these policies if 
broadly applied—or, broadly written. Imagine two different types of 
conduct policies (or, two types of provisions), both of which proscribe 
conduct that is also criminal. First, consider an employee conduct policy 
 
decrease their control over firm policy . . . .”). 
 117 The presence of employer “control” over a worker remains the touchstone of the 
common law test for whether a worker is an employee or an independent contractor. See, e.g., 
Daughtrey v. Honeywell, Inc., 3 F.3d 1488, 1496 (11th Cir. 1993) (identifying the key 
component in a determination of employment as the “hiring party’s right to control the 
manner and means by which the work is accomplished” (quoting Frankel v. Bally, Inc., 987 
F.2d 86, 90 (2d Cir. 1993))); Tieberg v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 471 P.2d 975, 977–78 
(Cal. 1970); J.M. v. Shell Oil Co., 922 S.W.2d 759, 764 (Mo. 1996) (en banc); Hageman v. Park 
W. Gardens, 480 N.W.2d 223, 226 (N.D. 1992); Averett v. Grange, 909 P.2d 246, 249 (Utah 
1995) (“In workers’ compensation cases, this court has consistently held that whether an 
employer-employee relationship exists depends upon the employer’s right to control the 
employee.”); Mountain Lodge Ass’n v. Crum & Forster Indem. Co., 558 S.E.2d 336, 342 (W. Va. 
2001). 
 118 See John Fabian Witt, Note, The Transformation of Work and the Law of Workplace 
Accidents, 1842–1910, 107 YALE L.J. 1467, 1480 (1998) (“For employers . . . a legal regime that 
imposed liability for work accidents could have created incentives to increase the extent of their 
control over the workplace and over the day-to-day conduct of employees.”). 
 119 See Gilbert v. Sycamore Mun. Hosp., 622 N.E.2d 788, 794 (Ill. 1993); Howard Levin, 
Note, Hospital Vicarious Liability for Negligence By Independent Contractor Physicians: A New 
Rule for New Times, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 1291, 1300–03. 
 120 This view could be defined in economic terms as a belief that the employer is the “least-
cost avoider” when it comes to preventing injury as a result of an employee’s conduct. See 
Richard J. Butler & John D. Worrall, Wage and Injury Response to Shifts in Workplace Liability, 
61 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 181, 182 (2008). Alternatively, the view could stem from a morals-
focused belief that if an employer benefits from the conduct of its employees, it would be wrong 
for society to have to bear the costs of employee misconduct. 
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that proscribes certain behavior at the workplace because that behavior 
causes unsafe working conditions or directly affects the quality of the 
product or service. (For example, if a mining company prohibits its 
miners from committing theft and using narcotics on company 
property.121) Second, consider a policy that bans criminal conduct that 
occurs away from the workplace and when an employee is not on duty. 
(For example, if the mining company prohibits its miners from “being 
convicted of [a] felony criminal offense.”)122 
Conduct policies of the first variety certainly might be used by 
employers to restrict workers unduly or for pretextual purposes. But—at 
least facially—they are unremarkable: rules are a staple of any workplace 
or industry, and prohibiting conduct that might endanger other workers 
or interfere with the functioning of the workplace is not noteworthy.123 
Therefore, I want to focus on the second variety (blanket prohibitions 
on criminality or criminal conduct). Without a clear tether to the safe or 
efficient functioning of an employer’s business, these kinds of terms or 
policies may function as criminal employment law. The employer 
effectively acts to punish privately, either in addition to, or instead of, 
the state. Certainly, we might explain this kind of behavior using each of 
the three rationales traced above. But, just because we can rationalize a 
policy does not make it normatively desirable. Do we trust employers as 
much as, or even more than, the state to respond to criminal conduct?124 
If employers might have private concerns (e.g., avoiding liability, 
maximizing profits)125 that ostensibly are foreign to the criminal system 
and traditional purposes of punishment, why should they have a role to 
play in furthering the criminal system’s ends? And, why should 
employers take any action before a formal determination of guilt? (I will 
return to these questions later.)126 
Having set up the legal framework for criminal employment law, 
the next two Parts will take two different tacks to examine criminal 
employment law’s flaws. Part III asks how to address the expansive 
scope and effects of criminal employment law. Part IV will return to the 
broader question of employers’ role as private actors in the criminal 
system and the ways in which the dual public/private nature of criminal 
employment law highlights problems with the legal treatment of 
employment. 
 
 121 See Mobil Coal Producing, Inc. v. Parks, 704 P.2d 702, 705 (Wyo. 1985). 
 122 Id. 
 123 For example, the employee handbook in Mobil Coal Producing, Inc. v. Parks also 
prohibits “refusing or willfully failing to carry out proper instructions,” “willfully damaging 
plant or personal property,” “violation of safety rules,” and “falsification of records.” Id. 
 124 See Post, supra note 15. 
 125 See supra text accompanying notes 104–19; cf. Jain, supra note 29, at 1232 (examining the 
incentives of individual prosecutors). 
 126 See infra Part IV. 
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III.     THE RESPONSES TO CRIMINAL EMPLOYMENT LAW 
How might the legal system lessen the unduly harsh impact of 
criminal law? By addressing a range of proposed legal reforms, this Part 
continues to examine how criminal employment law operates and why 
employers might discriminate against individuals with criminal records. 
I briefly examine a set of policy responses that scholars have identified 
as a means of mitigating collateral consequences, specifically as they 
apply to employment-related consequences. By pointing out the 
limitations of these solutions, I hope to highlight the particular 
problems posed by criminal employment law’s merger of public and 
private legal regimes. 
Whether employment consequences are best viewed as a form of 
punishment or as a costly side effect, they are an important part of the 
daily functioning of the criminal legal system. They present an area in 
which to consider the ways courts or law makers might exercise control 
over the spread and operation of the criminal system’s societal impact. 
As U.S. District Court Judge Lynn Adelman notes in calling for systemic 
reform: 
With respect to collateral consequences, despite the growing body of 
model laws and best practices created by entities interested in law 
reform, such as the American Bar Association, no state has yet 
comprehensively reformed the ways in which people with criminal 
convictions are prevented from participating in civic and business 
activities.127 
Private employers and private organizations might pose a set of 
obstacles and considerations absent from the public sector. Yet, that 
does not lessen the need to study and amend the ways in which these 
private arrangements continue to extend the force of criminal 
punishment. 
Therefore, this Part takes up the question of what such reforms 
might look like. I will describe several proposals, some of which have 
been raised by scholars, attorneys, and activists. A number of these 
proposals already have been adopted in certain jurisdictions, and a 
number more might prove beneficial if adopted. In my examination, 
though, I will note the potential limitations of each solution. These 
limitations ultimately lead to the discussion in Part IV. There, I will turn 
to the peculiarities of and problems with the public/private nature of 
employment and the role of private employers operating in the context 
of the criminal system. My goal is not to reject these proposals; for the 
reasons discussed below, I think that they might be positive, but, by 
 
 127 Lynn Adelman, Criminal Justice Reform: The Present Moment, 2015 WIS. L. REV. 181, 
189. 
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noting their limitations, I hope to emphasize the deeper structural 
problems posed by the relationship between private employers and the 
criminal system.128 
A.     Ending or Restricting Tort Liability 
Perhaps the most simple and straightforward remedy to the 
problems caused by negligent hiring and retention doctrines would be 
to abolish these tort doctrines altogether.129 This fix could come via 
judicial action (as these doctrines are judicially constructed) or 
legislative action.130 Under such a hypothetical legal regime, employers 
would no longer be liable for having negligently hired or retained 
employees with criminal records. If the fear of tort liability currently 
keeps employers from hiring or retaining individuals with criminal 
records,131 then removing the specter of tort liability should remove the 
bad incentives. Employers might still be liable for the conduct of their 
employees via respondeat superior, but that liability would turn on 
employees’ conduct performed within the scope of employment.132 
Notably, these proposed tort law regimes would not exclude all 
such liability for the hiring and retention of individuals with criminal 
records. A number of the proposals would allow for (or require) 
employers to consider certain types of criminal history when dealing 
with certain types of crimes. This exception or carve-out has certain 
intuitive appeal: if, for example, a job applicant has a history of violent 
offenses, wouldn’t we worry if she were hired for a security guard 
position where she would be licensed to use force against civilians? Or, 
if an applicant had been charged with child abuse, wouldn’t an employer 
be wise to consider these past offenses before hiring her as a daycare 
worker? If the touchstone of negligence liability is foreseeability, maybe 
we could imagine a regime in which tort liability was closely 
circumscribed in an effort to identify only the most foreseeable of 
injuries and to predict which employees would create the greatest risk. 
 
 128 The list of policy proposals in this Section is not exhaustive. Cf. Jennifer Leavitt, Note, 
Walking a Tightrope: Balancing Competing Public Interests in the Employment of Criminal 
Offenders, 34 CONN. L. REV. 1281, 1308 (2002) (describing state tax credit systems); 
Christopher Stafford, Note, Finding Work: How to Approach the Intersection of Prisoner 
Reentry, Employment, and Recidivism, 13 GEO. J. POVERTY L. & POL’Y 261, 269 (2006) (noting a 
possible system of financial incentives for employers to hire the formerly incarcerated). Nor are 
the discussions of the proposals themselves meant to be comprehensive. Rather, this Part gives 
a general overview of possible solutions as a way of highlighting the deeper problems that 
criminal employment law reveals. 
 129 See JACOBS, supra note 1, at 278–79. 
 130 See id. 
 131 See supra Section II.A. 
 132 See supra text accompanying notes 63–64. 
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 This line of analysis quickly gets us back to a central problem: in 
order to determine if an employee or applicant poses such a risk, 
someone would need to inspect her criminal record. This approach 
could take two forms: (1) the state formally could certify that an ex-
offender was not a future risk or was suitable to certain types of 
employment133; or (2) employers could be expected to survey criminal 
records and assess the future risk posed by a job applicant based on her 
record.134 Either approach leads through (or at least into) the quagmire 
of criminal record keeping.135 In an era of plea bargaining, it is difficult 
to conclude that a criminal conviction for offense X necessarily means 
that X was the only offense committed or that a jury ever determined 
there was proof beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant committed 
X.136 And, just because employers have access to more information via 
the internet does not mean that this information is always accurate or 
that employers are equipped to interpret the information they find.137 
Even aside from accuracy, either approach, public or private, 
should raise concerns. Public certificates of rehabilitations—which six 
states will grant in some cases138—are both over- and under-inclusive. 
That is, are there not some cases where an applicant might be 
rehabilitated to enter certain lines of work, but not others? And, perhaps 
more importantly, such certificates imply that some people with 
 
 133 See, e.g., N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 753(2) (McKinney 2018) (“[T]he public agency or private 
employer shall also give consideration to a certificate of relief from disabilities or a certificate of 
good conduct issued to the applicant, which certificate shall create a presumption of 
rehabilitation in regard to the offense or offenses specified therein.”); Love, supra note 4, at 
269–71; Mukamal & Samuels, supra note 41, at 1505. 
 134 See, e.g., JACOBS, supra note 1, at 283–84; Katherine A. Peebles, Note, Negligent Hiring 
and the Information Age: How State Legislatures Can Save Employers from Inevitable Liability, 
53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1397, 1418 (2012). 
 135 Given significant technological advances and variations among states, municipalities, and 
other record-keeping units, this is a rapidly changing area of law and practice shaped both by 
formal rules and informal practices. Nevertheless, James Jacobs’s recent work on criminal 
records in the United States provides a valuable overview of criminal records’ role in the U.S. 
criminal legal system. See generally JACOBS, supra note 1. 
 136 See id. at 284–85. 
 137 See, e.g., Employer Access to Criminal Background Checks: The Need for Efficiency and 
Accuracy: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism & Homeland Sec., 110th Cong. 7 
(2007) (statement of Frank A.S. Campbell, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal 
Policy, United States Department of Justice), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-
110hhrg34928/html/CHRG-110hhrg34928.htm; Walker Newell, The Legacy of Nixon, Reagan, 
and Horton: How the Tough on Crime Movement Enabled a New Regime of Race-Influenced 
Employment Discrimination, 15 BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y 3, 30–31 (2013); Sarah K. 
Starnes, Note, Interviewing Stripes Instead of Suits: Addressing the Inadequacy of Indiana’s 
Current Legislation and How to Assist Employers in Effectively Hiring Convicted Felons, 49 VAL. 
U. L. REV. 311, 321 (2014); Editorial, Opinion, Accuracy in Criminal Background Checks, N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 9, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/10/opinion/accuracy-in-criminal-
background-checks.html. 
 138 See Kristen A. Williams, Comment, Employing Ex-Offenders: Shifting the Evaluation of 
Workplace Risks and Opportunities from Employers to Corrections, 55 UCLA L. REV. 521, 547 
n.178 (2007) (collecting sources). 
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criminal records are not rehabilitated and that people with criminal 
records must be rehabilitated. Given that the criminal system does not 
embrace a single theory of punishment,139 and that it is not clear that all 
punishment is designed with a rehabilitative goal,140 it seems peculiar to 
use rehabilitation as the benchmark for reentry. Would the implication 
be that serving a sentence was not sufficient to atone for a crime? And 
do we really think that any and all law breaking is so anti-social as to 
require rehabilitation? Courts and scholars have struggled with the best 
way to predict future offending;141 it is not clear how certificates could 
serve as sufficiently reliable predictors of future dangerousness. 
Private analysis of criminal records also poses problems. Employee 
privacy is a casualty of background checks generally,142 and determining 
how egregious past misfeasance was or how much of a risk the 
prospective employee might be could require further intrusions. 
Although state-issued certificates would be problematic, employers’ 
judgments regarding future dangerousness or likelihood of recidivism 
seem even more troubling. What epistemic advantage do employers 
have in assessing these issues, and what reason do we have to think that 
employers have the same views or incentives as criminal justice actors 
when it comes time to determine how to react to past offenses?143 By 
continuing to require employers to conduct background checks, this 
narrowed tort liability still would not get employers out of the business 
of analyzing criminal records. 
Finally, it is worth noting that the prospect of tort liability might 
not be the only risk-focused legal regime pushing employers not to hire 
people with criminal records. Insurance policies might preclude 
coverage or raise premiums when employers did not use background 
 
 139 See, e.g., STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 18-2.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1994) (stating 
multiple purposes for sentencing); MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.02 (AM. LAW INST. 1985) (same); 
Carissa Byrne Hessick, Why Are Only Bad Acts Good Sentencing Factors?, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1109, 
1137 (2008). 
 140 See, e.g., Markus Dirk Dubber, Policing Possession: The War on Crime and the End of 
Criminal Law, 91 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 829, 841–45 (2001) (arguing that a predictive or 
incapacitation-based approach had replaced rehabilitation as a primary purpose of 
punishment); Malcolm M. Feeley & Jonathan Simon, The New Penology: Notes on an Emerging 
Strategy of Corrections and Its Implications, 30 CRIMINOLOGY 449, 449 (1992) (arguing that 
incapacitation had become the dominant ideology driving criminal law); Benjamin Levin, Guns 
and Drugs, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 2173 (2016). 
 141 See, e.g., Abdul-Kabir v. Quarterman, 550 U.S. 233, 241 (2007); Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 
104 (2003); Bernard E. Harcourt, Against Prediction: Sentencing, Policing, and Punishing in an 
Actuarial Age 2–5 (U. Chi. Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Papers, Paper No. 94, 
2005); Sonja B. Starr, Evidence-Based Sentencing and the Scientific Rationalization of 
Discrimination, 66 STAN. L. REV. 803, 807 (2014). 
 142 See, e.g., JACOBS, supra note 1, at 284–85; Erin Murphy, The Politics of Privacy in the 
Criminal Justice System: Information Disclosure, the Fourth Amendment, and Statutory Law 
Enforcement Exemptions, 111 MICH. L. REV. 485, 511 (2013); Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Privacy 
Versus Antidiscrimination, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 363 (2008). 
 143 I will return to these questions in Part IV. 
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checks or when they hired people with criminal records. Certainly, 
insurers might be less likely to adopt such restrictions absent the threat 
of tort liability under negligent hiring/retention. But—based on 
actuarial calculations and general risk averseness—insurers might retain 
these bars in a world without negligent hiring or negligent retention 
liability. Therefore, insurers might continue to re-inscribe the same 
troubling incentives, even if tort doctrine ostensibly fixed the problem. 
B.     Ban the Box 
Rather than relying exclusively on tort-based solutions, some 
scholars and activists have advocated statutory restrictions on 
employers’ use of criminal records in hiring.144 The ban-the-box 
movement, both domestically and internationally, has pushed for 
legislation to prohibit employers from considering criminal history in 
hiring decisions.145 By preventing employers from initially inquiring 
into criminal history, ban-the-box laws (i.e., laws that “remove the 
check box or question from employment applications that asks whether 
the applicant has ever been convicted of a crime”146) attempt to level the 
playing field for those with criminal records.147 
This strategy to curb collateral consequences in the labor market 
has achieved some political success. In 1998, Hawai’i passed the first 
legislation to remove criminal history questions from employment 
applications.148 In the ensuing decades, the movement spread to other 
jurisdictions.149 As of April 2018, one hundred and fity cities and thirty-
one states had passed some form of ban-the-box legislation.150 Further, 
in November 2015, President Obama “called on Congress to follow a 
growing number of states, cities, and private companies that have 
 
 144 This Section expands on arguments introduced in Benjamin Levin, Obama’s Post-Prison 
Jobs Plan Is Not Enough, TIME (May 12, 2016), http://time.com/4326135/obama-ban-the-box. 
 145 See, e.g., Jessica A. Clarke, Against Immutability, 125 YALE L.J. 2, 79 (2015); Joseph 
Fishkin, The Anti-Bottleneck Principle in Employment Discrimination Law, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 
1429, 1455 (2014); Jessica S. Henry & James B. Jacobs, Ban the Box to Promote Ex-Offender 
Employment, 6 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 755, 757 (2007); Christina O’Connell, Note, Ban 
the Box: A Call to the Federal Government to Recognize a New Form of Employment 
Discrimination, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 2801, 2804 (2015). 
 146 Fishkin, supra note 145, at 1455. 
 147 See Adam M. Samaha & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Don’t Ask, Must Tell—and Other 
Combinations, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 919, 930 n.48 (2015). 
 148 See HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 378-2.5 (West 2018). The “ban-the-box” name was later 
adopted by the activist group “All of Us or None.” See Eumi K. Lee, Commentary, The 
Centerpiece to Real Reform? Political, Legal, and Social Barriers to Reentry in California, 7 
HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 243, 255–56 (2010). 
 149 See, e.g., O’Connell, supra note 145, at 2804–06; Smith, supra note 17, at 212. 
 150 See Beth Avery & Phil Hernandez, Ban the Box: U.S. Cities, Counties, and States Adopt 
Fair Hiring Policies, NAT’L EMP. L. PROJECT (Apr. 20, 2018), https://www.nelp.org/publication/
ban-the-box-fair-chance-hiring-state-and-local-guide. 
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decided to ‘ban the box’ on job applications” and directed the Office of 
Personnel Management to delay background checks “until later in the 
hiring process.”151 And, in 2016, President Obama went so far as to 
propose that all federal employers adopt ban-the-box rules.152 In short, 
banning the box is an increasingly mainstream approach to the 
problems of reentry and re-employment for the previously incarcerated. 
However, these statutes, ordinances, and policies have some 
significant limitations. Most only restrict the behavior of public 
employers;153 they have frequent exceptions for types of employment 
and classes of employment;154 and they often are silent as to when and to 
what extent employers may consider criminal history.155 And, like a 
number of other policy proposals discussed here, ban-the-box has little 
to tell us about the rights of workers who have already been hired and 
then are arrested or charged with a crime. As Jonathan Smith, then-
Assistant Counsel to the NAACP observed, ban-the-box provisions “do 
not, for the most part, preclude an employer’s consideration of criminal 
history information. They simply delay it to later stages in the screening 
process.”156 That is, these provisions do not constitute a comprehensive 
anti-discrimination regime. Rather, they may offer a foothold for some 
job applicants to climb over the structural obstacles of life with a 
criminal record, but they do not necessarily remove the obstacles.157 
Further, a recent study by Amanda Agan and Sonja Starr showed 
that ban-the-box policies might produce some troubling unintended 
consequences—specifically, ban-the-box might increase employer 
discrimination in job callbacks.158 Based on a sample of New York and 
New Jersey employers, Agan and Starr found that after these laws went 
into effect, “white applicants went from being 7% more likely to receive 
a callback than similar black applicants to being 45% more likely.”159 
Agan and Starr offer two possible explanations: (1) “statistical 
discrimination against black men”—absent background checks, 
 
 151 Press Release, White House, Fact Sheet: President Obama Announces New Actions to 
Promote Rehabilitation and Reintegration for the Formerly-Incarcerated (Nov. 2, 2015), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/11/02/fact-sheet-president-obama-
announces-new-actions-promote-rehabilitation. 
 152 Press Release, White House, Fact Sheet: During National Reentry Week, Reducing 
Barriers to Reentry and Employment for Formerly Incarcerated Individuals (Apr. 29, 2016), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/04/29/fact-sheet-during-national-reentry-
week-reducing-barriers-reentry-and. 
 153 See Smith, supra note 17, at 213. 
 154 See id. at 217. 
 155 See id. at 215. 
 156 See id. at 211. 
 157 Cf. JANET E. HALLEY, DON’T: A READER’S GUIDE TO THE MILITARY’S ANTI-GAY POLICY 
(1999) (arguing that “don’t ask, don’t tell” empowered state actors to discriminate based on 
status, while providing the illusion that they were reacting to conduct). 
 158 See Agan & Starr, supra note 53, at 31. 
 159 Id. at 33. 
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employers might be more likely to assume that black applicants, rather 
than white applicants, had criminal records; or (2) “benefits for white 
applicants”—without information about criminal records, employers 
simply might prefer white applicants, so that a white applicant with a 
record might be more likely to get a job that a black applicant without 
one.160 While we do not know what actually accounts for Agan and 
Starr’s findings, the proffered explanations for this phenomenon both 
suggest that ban-the-box laws cannot be treated in a vacuum. The causes 
speak not only to possible shortcomings in the legislation itself but also 
to broader pathologies of race and class in the labor market and criminal 
system.161 
None of these critiques is intended to diminish the positives of 
ban-the-box or the very real possibility that it is the most politically 
feasible option discussed in this Part. But, if we are concerned more 
broadly with the relationship between private employers and the 
criminal system, it is not clear that—as written—many of the ban-the-
box policies provide a comprehensive, long-term solution to the 
problem. 
C.     An Employment Discrimination Model for Criminal Records 
To the extent that ban-the-box does not go far enough, perhaps the 
answer is a comprehensive anti-discrimination approach. Using Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964162 as a model, some scholars and 
commentators have argued that the best means of addressing 
discrimination against the formerly incarcerated is to treat it as 
discrimination.163 Under this framework, individuals with criminal 
records might become a suspect class whose employment status would 
not rise and fall entirely on the whim of their employers.164 
Alternatively, some have argued that discrimination against those with 
criminal records violates Title VII because of the disparate impact of 
 
 160 See id. at 34. 
 161 Indeed, some scholars and advocates have argued that the issues identified by Agan and 
Starr are not problems with ban-the-box policies; rather the issues are signs of underlying racial 
discrimination. See Maurice Emsellem & Beth Avery, Racial Profiling in Hiring: A Critique of 
New “Ban the Box” Studies, NAT’L EMP. L. PROJECT (Aug. 11, 2016), http://www.nelp.org/
publication/racial-profiling-in-hiring-a-critique-of-new-ban-the-box-studies; Noah Zatz, Ban 
the Box and Perverse Consequences, Part I, ONLABOR (Aug. 2, 2016), https://onlabor.org/2016/
08/02/ban-the-box-and-perverse-consequences-part-i. 
 162 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17 (2012). 
 163 See, e.g., RODRIGUEZ & EMSELLEM, supra note 50, at 19–21; Mukamal & Samuels, supra 
note 41, at 1503; Mullings, supra note 20, at 264; Jocelyn Simonson, Rethinking “Rational 
Discrimination” Against Ex-Offenders, 13 GEO. J. POVERTY L. & POL’Y 283, 287–88 (2006). 
 164 See, e.g., Aukerman, supra note 35, at 52–53; Geiger, supra note 74 (tracing this line of 
argument). But see Schanuel v. Anderson, 546 F. Supp. 519, 524 (S.D. Ill. 1982). 
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such discrimination on black and Latino job applicants.165 The Supreme 
Court has never directly addressed criminal record discrimination,166 
but we do have some guidance on how such litigation would proceed. 
First, some states have adopted a discrimination-based approach. 
New York, for example, prohibits employers from denying employment 
“by reason of the [applicant’s] having been previously convicted of one 
or more criminal offenses, or by reason of a finding of lack of ‘good 
moral character’ when such finding is based upon the fact that the 
individual has previously been convicted of one or more criminal 
offenses . . . .”167 
Second, the federal government has weighed in on the potential 
issues posed by employment discrimination against those with criminal 
records. In 2012, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(EEOC) weighed in on the place of criminal background checks in the 
workplace, providing official guidance on the issue.168 Addressing the 
interplay between Title VII and the criminal legal system, the EEOC 
noted the limitations of the current legal regime: 
Having a criminal record is not listed as a protected basis in Title VII. 
Therefore, whether a covered employer’s reliance on a criminal 
record to deny employment violates Title VII depends on whether it 
is part of a claim of employment discrimination based on race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin.169  
That is, absent some other legal determination that individuals 
with a criminal history are a suspect class, a discrimination analysis 
would rest on the racial identity of those with criminal records. 
Nevertheless, relying on statistical evidence of criminal law’s disparate 
impact on people of color,170 the EEOC has advised employers that 
blanket criminal records exclusions can have a disparate impact based 
on race or national origin, thus falling afoul of Title VII’s bar on 
 
 165 See, e.g., EEOC v. Freeman, 778 F.3d 463, 465 (4th Cir. 2015); Green v. Mo. Pac. R.R., 523 
F.2d 1290, 1295–98 (8th Cir. 1975); Tammy R. Pettinato, Employment Discrimination Against 
Ex-Offenders: The Promise and Limits of Title VII Disparate Impact Theory, 98 MARQ. L. REV. 
831, 832–33 (2014). 
 166 See El v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth. (SEPTA), 479 F.3d 232, 240 (3d Cir. 2007). But see N.Y.C 
Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979) (refusing to hire worker using methadone to 
recover from addiction to illegal narcotics); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 
(1973) (refusing to hire worker who previously had participated in illegal protest against 
employer). 
 167 N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 752 (McKinney 2018); see also Leavitt, supra note 128, at 1294–98. 
 168 U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, 915.002, EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE: 
CONSIDERATION OF ARREST AND CONVICTION RECORDS IN EMPLOYMENT DECISIONS UNDER 
TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 (Apr. 25, 2012) [hereinafter EEOC ENFORCEMENT 
GUIDANCE], http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/upload/arrest_conviction.pdf. 
 169 Id. at 6. 
 170 See id. at 8–9; see also United States v. Valdovinos, 760 F.3d 322, 330–41 (4th Cir. 2014) 
(Davis, J., dissenting) (collecting statistics); United States v. Blewett, 719 F.3d 482 (6th Cir. 
2013), vacated en banc, 746 F.3d 647 (6th Cir. 2013) (critiquing the racial impact of drug laws). 
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discrimination.171 
However, the hiring practice’s disparate impact alone is not 
sufficient to prove a Title VII violation.172 Rather, a disparate impact 
finding simply shifts the burden of persuasion to the employer to 
demonstrate that “the challenged practice is job related for the position 
in question and consistent with business necessity . . . .”173 The exact 
contours of the business necessity defense continue to confound courts 
and commentators,174 but the Third Circuit has addressed the 
exception’s application to criminal-record-based discrimination.175 In El 
v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority (SEPTA),176 
Douglas El brought a Title VII claim against SEPTA after he was fired 
from his job as a medical transportation worker because of his criminal 
history.177 Forty years earlier, when he was fifteen, El had been convicted 
of second-degree murder.178 SEPTA had hired El conditionally pending 
a background check, but fired him immediately upon learning of the 
conviction.179 El, who was black, claimed that SEPTA’s blanket 
prohibition on employing anyone with a “violent felony” conviction had 
a racially disparate impact.180 The Third Circuit rejected this argument, 
concluding that SEPTA’s policy fell within the business necessity 
exception because of the close contact between patients and employees 
 
 171 See EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 168, at 8–10. 
 172 See id. at 10–11. 
 173 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2012); see Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 
642 (1989); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971); EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, 
supra note 168, at 10–11. But see El v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth. (SEPTA), 479 F.3d 232, 239 n.9 (3d 
Cir. 2007) (“[T]he successful assertion of the business necessity defense is not an ironclad 
shield; rather, the plaintiff can overcome it by showing that an alternative policy exists that 
would serve the employer’s legitimate goals as well as the challenged policy with less of a 
discriminatory effect.”). 
 174 See, e.g., SEPTA, 479 F.3d at 241; Susan S. Grover, The Business Necessity Defense in 
Disparate Impact Discrimination Cases, 30 GA. L. REV. 387, 391–93 (1996); Andrew C. 
Spiropoulos, Defining the Business Necessity Defense to the Disparate Impact Cause of Action: 
Finding the Golden Mean, 74 N.C. L. REV. 1479, 1520 (1996). 
 175 SEPTA, 479 F.3d at 241. In Green v. Missouri Pacific Railroad, 523 F.2d 1290 (8th Cir. 
1975), the Eighth Circuit also addressed a criminal record–based Title VII claim. In Green, the 
employer refused to hire applicants with any criminal history beyond traffic infractions. Id. at 
1292. While the court held that this policy was overbroad, the decision predated Wards Cove 
Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989), and subsequent congressional clarification that 
expanded the scope of the exception. 
 176 479 F.3d 232. 
 177 Id. at 235. 
 178 Id. at 235–36. 
 179 See id. 
 180 Id. at 235. Specifically, SEPTA would not hire anyone with a “record of driving under 
[the] influence . . . of alcohol or drugs, and [a] record of any felony or misdemeanor conviction 
for any crime of moral turpitude or of violence against any person(s),” or “any conviction 
within the last seven (7) years for any other felony or any other misdemeanor in any category 
referenced below (see section F.2.10.C) [listing specific offenses],” or who was “on probation or 
parole for any such crime, no matter how long ago the conviction for such crime may be.” Id. at 
235–236 (alterations in original). 
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and the predictive value of past convictions.181 The court noted that “it 
is impossible to measure the risk perfectly,” but “Title VII does not ask 
the impossible. It does, however, as in the case of performance-related 
policies, require that the policy under review accurately distinguish 
between applicants that pose an unacceptable level of risk and those that 
do not.”182 
Therefore, as with the other policy proposals, we are left with the 
question of risk management and risk prediction. As a result, aside from 
concerns about practicability due to judicial resistance to Title VII 
suits,183 an employment discrimination model raises two primary 
issues—“rational discrimination”184 and worker privacy. First, courts 
may well conclude that much discrimination against those with criminal 
records is rational. In other words, the business necessity exception (or 
analogous provisions under state law) might swallow the rule. Indeed, in 
critiquing the concept of rational discrimination against people with 
criminal records, Jocelyn Simonson has shown that this rationale largely 
de-fanged New York’s statutory protections for job applicants with 
criminal records.185 This comes as no surprise, as the New York statute 
contains a sweeping “business necessity” exception of its own: 
employers can discriminate if 
(1) there is a direct relationship between one or more of the previous 
criminal offenses and the specific license or employment sought or 
held by the individual; or (2) the issuance or continuation of the 
license or the granting or continuation of the employment would 
involve an unreasonable risk to property or to the safety or welfare of 
specific individuals or the general public.186 
What is “unreasonable”? And, what constitutes a “direct 
relationship”? In short, it is not a stretch to see how employers might 
explain a great deal of discrimination in rational terms as calculated to 
protect their own interests and those of consumers and other 
employees. 
Second, much like the strategy of curbing tort liability, this 
employment-discrimination approach quickly raises employee privacy 
concerns. It is unlikely that under a discrimination paradigm an 
employer never could discriminate against a worker based on her 
 
 181 See id. at 246–47. 
 182 Id. at 244–45 (footnote omitted). 
 183 See Richard Primus, The Future of Disparate Impact, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1341, 1365 
(2010) (“For as long as courts have recognized disparate impact claims under Title VII, 
disparate impact suits have been notoriously difficult for plaintiffs to win . . . .”). 
 184 See generally JACOBS, supra note 1, at 277–78, 304; Simonson, supra note 163 (describing 
and critiquing the ways in which rational discrimination applies to those with criminal 
records). 
 185 See Simonson, supra note 163, at 286–87. 
 186 N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 752 (McKinney 2018). 
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criminal history. Judging from the statutory licensing schemes discussed 
above as well as the carve-outs to ban-the-box laws, there is strong 
public support for keeping some people with some criminal histories out 
of some jobs. And, as in the tort context, determining whose criminal 
history is sufficiently serious would require someone to assess criminal 
history. Put simply, the same issues raised in the tort context apply 
here187: either (1) employers would be responsible for this screening, 
putting them on notice of all an applicant’s past misconduct and 
allowing them to determine what offense predicted future 
dangerousness/offending; or (2) the state would have to provide some 
prediction of future dangerousness.188 
D.     Contractual Solutions to the Problem of Conduct Policies 
The background rules of tort law and employment discrimination 
certainly might drive employers’ incentives to adopt employee conduct 
policies. Regardless of whether there is a change in these background 
rules, though, contract law might offer some assistance in reigning in 
the policies themselves. That is, as discussed in Part II, employee 
conduct policies are agreements between employers and (sometimes 
unionized) workers.189 Therefore, if we look to contract law here, we 
might land on one of the contractual doctrines designed to restrict the 
content or form of an agreement.190 But it is hard to imagine judges 
 
 187 See supra Section III.A. 
 188 Finally, it is worth noting another problem with adopting an employment discrimination 
paradigm: to the extent that we are concerned about marginalized or “disadvantaged” job 
applicants, particularly people of color, focusing on people with criminal records seems like an 
under-inclusive and imperfect approach. See JACOBS, supra note 1, at 300. That is, creating a 
single carve-out to at-will employment would retain at-will employment for many others and 
might not address the structural barriers to labor market entry that affect many without 
criminal records. Or, as James Jacobs argues, such a system might ultimately benefit those with 
criminal records at the expense of other job applicants from disadvantaged backgrounds. See id. 
at 298–300. That being said, the criminal system already singles out those with criminal records 
for certain services. Halfway houses, job training, and certain supervisory aspects of probation 
are among the services that people with criminal records receive, while those without criminal 
histories might not. The exclusivity of these benefits and services (i.e., that they are not 
available to anyone, or at least anyone of limited means) is justified on the grounds of 
facilitating reentry. See, e.g., Iacaboni v. United States, 251 F. Supp. 2d 1015, 1022–23 (D. Mass. 
2003); S. David Mitchell, Impeding Reentry: Agency and Judicial Obstacles to Longer Halfway 
House Placements, 16 MICH. J. RACE & L. 235, 239 (2011). That is, the state has marked 
individuals as criminals, and, without some assistance, that mark will stay with them, 
preventing them from re-socialization and increasing the likelihood of recidivism. See, e.g., 
Corey Rayburn Yung, Banishment by a Thousand Laws: Residency Restrictions on Sex 
Offenders, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 101, 141 (2007). We might be skeptical about whether those 
services should be viewed as “benefits” rather than extensions of punishment or vehicles of 
social control. But, it is worth noting that they might be viewed or framed as benefits. 
 189 See supra Section II.B. 
 190 In unionized shops, we also might hope that unions would bargain around such 
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broadly applying a set of doctrines (e.g., unconscionability) that tend to 
be disfavored and that courts rarely embrace.191 
Perhaps these agreements could be void as against public 
policy192—a court might hold that the provisions of a conduct policy 
that impose penalties on workers based on arrests, convictions, etc. fall 
afoul of some broader public interest or policy.193 An agreement might 
be void for public policy agreements “if legislation provides that it is 
unenforceable or the interest in its enforcement is clearly outweighed in 
the circumstances by a public policy against the enforcement of such 
terms.”194 But what policy? The broader framework of criminal 
employment law and the statutory network of collateral consequences 
hardly speak to a preference for forgiveness.195 Indeed, the broader web 
of collateral consequences that accompany conviction suggests that the 
legal regime we have is one in which ex-offenders generally cannot 
escape their records and criminal conviction is treated as a reliable 
predictor of future risk.196 
Returning to the morals clause analogy or to what Stephen 
Sugarman calls “lifestyle discrimination,”197 it might be that courts 
 
agreements or seek to modify their terms. That being said, given power dynamics in collective 
bargaining and the range of other benefits that unions seek to maximize, employee conduct 
agreements might remain a comparatively attractive concession (particularly when compared 
with wages, benefits, etc.). See Marks, supra note 93 (describing the National Football League 
Players Association’s treatment of the personnel conduct policy during collective bargaining). 
 191 See generally Hazel Glenn Beh, Curing the Infirmities of the Unconscionability Doctrine, 
66 HASTINGS L.J. 1011 (2015) (examining the successes and failures of unconscionability 
litigation). 
 192 Even under an expansive “safety net” conception of the unconscionability doctrine, see 
Amy J. Schmitz, Embracing Unconscionability’s Safety Net Function, 58 ALA. L. REV. 73, 74 
(2006), it would be highly unlikely that a court would conclude that the sorts of provisions in 
the employee conduct policies discussed above would be unconscionable. 
 193 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178 (AM. LAW INST. 1981); cf. Juliet P. 
Kostritsky, Illegal Contracts and Efficient Deterrence: A Study in Modern Contract Theory, 74 
IOWA L. REV. 115, 117 n.5 (1988) (discussing the policies identified by courts); Percy H. 
Winfield, Public Policy in the English Common Law, 42 HARV. L. REV. 76, 76, 85–86 (1928) 
(same). 
 194 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178(1). 
 195 See JACOBS, supra note 1, at 226 (“[T]he strong link between pervasive employment 
discrimination and high recidivism rates is unsurprising, albeit extremely frustrating, in light of 
statutorily sanctioned policies that seem specially designed to facilitate private sector bias 
against convicted persons.”). 
 196 See, e.g., State v. Funk, 349 P.3d 1230, 1234 (Kan. 2015); Trantino v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 
764 A.2d 940, 972 (N.J. 2001), modified, 772 A.2d 926 (N.J. 2001) (“[R]esearch in the area of 
risk assessment demonstrates that prior criminal history is probably the most important factor 
in predicting future risk.”); Bernard E. Harcourt, Risk as a Proxy for Race: The Dangers of Risk 
Assessment, 27 FED. SENT’G REP. 237, 237 (2015) (discussing the relationship between race and 
criminal history as proxies for future dangerousness). 
 197 See generally Stephen D. Sugarman, “Lifestyle” Discrimination in Employment, 24 
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 377 (2003). Sugarman defines lifestyle discrimination as decisions 
made by employers to discipline or discharge workers for conduct away from work. See id. at 
378–79. 
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would be suspicious of agreements that sweep in too much conduct with 
no apparent relationship to work or to the employer’s business.198 To 
the extent that courts view employment contracts as existing against a 
backdrop of public preference for employee privacy, these concerns 
might have some legal bite. Courts tend to grant employers great 
latitude in restricting employee conduct, but that needn’t mean that 
employer control is unlimited.199 However, as discussed in the previous 
Sections, employers might still provide compelling (or at least colorable) 
claims of why conduct away from work does spill over into the 
workplace or might have some nexus to employment.200 
E.     Employment Consequences at Sentencing 
A common goal of the literature on collateral consequences is the 
incorporation of collateral harms into the sentencing and plea 
process.201 As noted in the discussion of the ABA Standards, sentencing 
plays a key role in proposed reforms.202 There are two ways in which 
collateral consequences could be integrated into the sentencing process: 
(1) via notice by court or counsel; or (2) via integration into the 
sentence itself. 
1.     Notice of Consequences 
First, scholars have argued that notice of collateral consequences is 
essential and that defendants must know what fate awaits them after 
they plead guilty.203 The Standards explicitly endorse this notice 
concern, recommending a requirement “that the defendant is fully 
informed, before pleading guilty and at sentencing, of the collateral 
sanctions applicable to the offense(s) charged . . . .”204 This concern and 
the need for notice has taken on greater significance not simply because 
 
 198 See supra text accompanying notes 94–97. 
 199 See infra Part III (discussing and critiquing the expansive scope of employer control of 
employee conduct outside of work). 
 200 See Sugarman, supra note 197, at 379. 
 201 See, e.g., Sandra G. Mayson, Collateral Consequences and the Preventive State, 91 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 301, 303 (2015); Kevin R. Reitz, The Economic Rehabilitation of Offenders: 
Recommendations of the Model Penal Code (Second), 99 MINN. L. REV. 1735, 1754 (2015). 
 202 See A.B.A., supra note 4, at 2–3. 
 203 See, e.g., Jain, supra note 29, at 1210; Brian M. Murray, Beyond the Right to Counsel: 
Increasing Notice of Collateral Consequences, 49 U. RICH. L. REV. 1139, 1141–42 (2015); Michael 
Pinard, The Logistical and Ethical Difficulties of Informing Juveniles About the Collateral 
Consequences of Adjudications, 6 NEV. L.J. 1111 (2006); Pinard & Thompson, supra note 46, at 
590–93; Roberts, supra note 5, at 677. 
 204 A.B.A., supra note 4, at 1. 
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of the increasing number and severity of collateral consequences,205 but 
also because of the rise of plea bargaining.206 In a criminal system where 
a vanishingly small percentage of cases go to trial,207 it is critical that 
defendants know exactly what punishment they are agreeing to. From a 
contractual perspective, how can a defendant knowingly agree to the 
terms of a plea bargain if she does not fully understand the terms—that 
the sentence she agrees to is not the end of her punishment and that her 
criminal status carries with it other costs and consequences?208 
This concern has garnered significant attention in the context of 
immigration-related collateral consequences. In Padilla v. Kentucky,209 
the Supreme Court took an unprecedented step towards recognizing the 
importance of collateral consequences at sentencing and as a 
component of plea deals.210 The Court held that defendants have a Sixth 
Amendment right to be informed of immigration consequences that 
flow from a guilty plea.211 The petitioner, Jose Padilla, a U.S. permanent 
resident, had pleaded guilty to transporting marijuana and, as a result of 
his conviction, was subject to deportation.212 Padilla claimed that his 
attorney’s failure to warn him of these immigration consequences prior 
to the guilty plea amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel, and the 
Court agreed.213 Padilla sparked even more scholarly work on collateral 
consequences, in hopes of expanding the Court’s rationale further and 
requiring additional notice prior to a plea.214 
 
 205 See supra text accompanying note 5. 
 206 See, e.g., Murray, supra note 203, at 1142; Jenny Roberts, Ignorance Is Effectively Bliss: 
Collateral Consequences, Silence, and Misinformation in the Guilty-Plea Process, 95 IOWA L. 
REV. 119 (2009). 
 207 See, e.g., Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 372 (2010) (“Pleas account for nearly 95% of 
all criminal convictions.”); GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING’S TRIUMPH: A HISTORY OF PLEA 
BARGAINING IN AMERICA 9–10 (2003); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster, 101 
YALE L.J. 1979, 1986 (1992); William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and Criminal Law’s 
Disappearing Shadow, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2548 (2004). 
 208 See generally Stephanos Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market: From Caveat 
Emptor to Consumer Protection, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1117 (2011) (describing a potential judicial 
shift to regulating the terms of plea bargaining more carefully). 
 209 559 U.S. 356 (2010). 
 210 See, e.g., Chin & Love, supra note 20, at 21 (“There are only a handful of Supreme Court 
decisions in the past 50 years that can be said to have transformed the operation of the criminal 
justice system. Padilla v. Kentucky may be such a case.”); Logan, supra note 25, at 1104; Joanna 
Rosenberg, Note, A Game Changer? The Impact of Padilla v. Kentucky on the Collateral 
Consequences Rule and Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 1407, 
1409–10 (2013). But cf. Darryl K. Brown, Why Padilla Doesn’t Matter (Much), 58 UCLA L. REV. 
1393, 1395 (2011) (arguing that Padilla will have limited impact because it requires defense 
attorneys to stay apprised of a vast web of collateral consequences). 
 211 Padilla, 559 U.S. at 360. 
 212 Id. at 359. 
 213 See id. at 374–75. 
 214 See, e.g., JACOBS, supra note 1, at 248; Bibas, supra note 208, at 1146–51; Chin & Love, 
supra note 20, at 21; Alice Clapman, Petty Offenses, Drastic Consequences: Toward a Sixth 
Amendment Right to Counsel for Noncitizen Defendants Facing Deportation, 33 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 585 (2011); Steven Zeidman, Padilla v. Kentucky: Sound and Fury, or Transformative 
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Unfortunately, a Padilla-style notice requirement probably would 
be a bad fit for private employment consequences. That is not to say that 
the logic is not compelling—unemployment may pale in comparison to 
deportation, but both are dramatic, life altering circumstances that a 
defendant and her family may face as a result of a conviction. Regardless 
of whether they formally are “punishment,” they flow from conviction. 
Yet, it is difficult to imagine what notice of employment consequences 
would look like in practice—or how it would matter. Would a criminal 
defense attorney be required to produce statistical evidence of employer 
bias?215 Would the sentencing court consider cost of living and compare 
it to salaries from employers likely to hire ex-offenders? 
In a sense, this issue represents an extension of a general problem 
with Padilla’s implementation. Darryl Brown has argued that Padilla 
actually will be of limited use to defendants because it places the onus of 
learning and appreciating all collateral consequences on the defense 
attorney.216 For a defendant to understand fully the consequences of her 
conviction, her attorney would need to grasp and be aware of a massive 
range of statutes and state and federal schemes that would affect her 
client post-conviction.217 As noted above, the NICCC makes it easier to 
scour state and federal codes to identify collateral consequences.218 But 
this remains a vast and shifting legal landscape.219 And, given the crisis 
in indigent defense, where attorneys are often under-funded and 
overworked,220 it is not at all clear that the defense attorney is the best 
actor to address these issues. Even if Brown were overly pessimistic in 
the context of statutory collateral sanctions, his point resonates strongly 
when we consider informal collateral consequences. Communities are 
home to different businesses with different hiring practices. Therefore, 
the employment consequences that a defendant will face are contingent 
upon the idiosyncratic and personal decisions of a range of private 
actors.221 And, while it would not be unreasonable to expect an attorney 
(or the court) to offer general warnings about the challenges faced by 
 
Impact, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 203 (2011). 
 215 But cf. supra note 36 and accompanying text (discussing other legal areas that involve 
predictive evidence about private employers and the ability to find work). 
 216 See Brown, supra note 210, at 1395. 
 217 See generally id.; Jain, supra note 29, at 1213. 
 218 See supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
 219 See Brown, supra note 210, at 1395 (“The problem for defendants like Mr. Padilla who 
face grave collateral consequences after conviction is the substantive criminal law and 
sentencing law, the civil law regimes that create collateral consequences, and, at least in 
immigration law, the limited procedural possibilities for avoiding or mitigating those 
consequences.”). 
 220 See generally Mary Sue Backus & Paul Marcus, The Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases, a 
National Crisis, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 1031 (2006) (describing the funding obstacles to effective 
representation of indigent defendants); Stephen B. Bright, Legal Representation for the Poor: 
Can Society Afford This Much Injustice?, 75 MO. L. REV. 683 (2010) (same). 
 221 But see supra Part II (examining the structural forces that shape these decisions). 
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individuals with criminal records, these warnings could not tell a 
defendant with certainty what the world would look like for her post-
conviction. 
Ultimately, regardless of how specific that advice were, it is not 
clear how meaningful such advice would be or how far it could go in 
addressing the core problems of criminal employment law. Assuming 
that most defendants are aware of some general stigma associated with 
criminal conviction, knowledge might not be the problem. Rather, the 
problem is the stigma. 
2.     Consequences as Punishment 
Another means of approaching criminal employment law at 
sentencing is to treat private employment consequences as punishment. 
Many decisions about probation, parole, and conditions of release focus 
on the granular or quotidian details of criminal defendants’ lives—
where a former offender can and cannot live; where she can and cannot 
travel; with whom she can and cannot associate.222 Employment 
consequences are implicated by many of these restrictions and 
decisions, but courts and probation departments generally do not 
address them explicitly or on the record. That is, restrictions on where, 
for whom, or in what industry a former offender may work, are a staple 
of the modern criminal system and the carceral state. But they are 
largely invisible.223 Courts do not explicitly weigh these costs to 
determine if they are proportional to a given offense or if a given 
defendant is deserving of this added punishment. 
A system that purports to value proportionality and individual 
tailoring of punishment should be required to consider and internalize 
collateral consequences.224 As Jack Chin puts it, “[s]entencing is 
 
 222 See, e.g., United States v. Floyd, 491 F. App’x 331, 332 (3d Cir. 2012) (discussing travel 
restrictions); State v. Myers, 923 P.2d 1024, 1041 (Kan. 1996) (discussing housing and 
employment restrictions); Tonja Jacobi et al., The Attrition of Rights Under Parole, 87 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 887, 905–39 (2014) (cataloging restrictions imposed on parolees); Cecelia Klingele, 
Rethinking the Use of Community Supervision, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1015 (2013) 
(describing restrictions on liberty imposed as a part of community supervision). 
 223 See Travis, supra note 6, at 22. 
 224 See Richard A. Bierschbach & Stephanos Bibas, Constitutionally Tailoring Punishment, 
112 MICH. L. REV. 397, 407 (2013). As a general matter, prior to sentencing, courts consider 
sentencing memoranda or pre-sentencing reports. See, e.g., Stanton Wheeler, Adversarial 
Biography: Reflections on the Sentencing of Michael Milken, 3 FED. SENT’G REP. 167, 169 (1990). 
These memoranda often include biographical information intended to provide context and 
influence the judge’s decision. See, e.g., United States v. Soto, 660 F.3d 1264, 1266 (10th Cir. 
2011); United States v. Begay, 117 F. App’x 682, 684 (10th Cir. 2004). Further, at sentencing it is 
not uncommon for judges to make statements about the defendant’s character or personal 
background and explain how these characteristics affected the judge’s decision and the ultimate 
sentence. See, e.g., United States v. Zuniga-Lazaro, 388 F.3d 308, 311 (7th Cir. 2004); United 
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designed to impose punishment that is proportionate to the offense and 
consistent with that imposed on similar offenders. These goals cannot 
be achieved without evaluating the total package of sentencing facing an 
individual.”225 Again, the Standards identify this rationale and (at least 
generally) a potential fix.226 The Standards recommend that courts (and 
perhaps legislators) “include collateral sanctions as a factor in 
determining the appropriate sentence . . . .”227 
But, again, this solution appears to be a bad fit for private criminal 
employment law consequences. While the literature on collateral 
consequences tends to argue that the consequences constitute 
punishment,228 “collateral consequences are not, strictly speaking, 
punishment,”229 and courts have not embraced this expansive 
conception of punishment.230 To the extent that courts are unwilling to 
treat a range of formal collateral consequences as punishment, it is 
highly unlikely that they would be willing to treat these informal 
collateral consequences as punishment. 
Further, as discussed in the context of notice at sentencing, the 
contingency of the employment consequences remains a sticking point. 
While an attorney, judge, or probation department might predict the 
challenges involved in finding or retaining employment post sentence, 
these predictions will be probabilities, rather than certainties. 
Additionally, as Pager and others have shown, the likelihood of 
significant employment consequences may depend on a range of other 
variables including the defendant’s race and education level,231 as well as 
the employment practices of businesses in the area. 
 
States v. Dominguez, 296 F.3d 192, 195 (3d Cir. 2002); United States v. Sloane, 308 F.R.D. 85, 86 
(E.D.N.Y. 2015); United States v. Norton, 218 F. Supp. 2d 1014, 1017 (E.D. Wis. 2002); cf. Laura 
I. Appleman, Retributive Justice and Hidden Sentencing, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1307, 1308 (2007) 
(examining “hidden (or ancillary) sentencing proceedings”). 
 225 Chin, The New Civil Death, supra note 8, at 1830. 
 226 See A.B.A., supra note 4, at 2. 
 227 Id. at 1, 18. 
 228 See, e.g., Alec C. Ewald, Collateral Consequences and the Perils of Categorical Ambiguity, 
in LAW AS PUNISHMENT / LAW AS REGULATION 77, 93 (Austin Sarat et al. eds., 2011) 
(“[C]ommentators from a variety of perspectives have concluded that collateral sanctions are a 
legal burden constituting punishment.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Mayson, supra 
note 201, at 314–17. 
 229 Chin, The New Civil Death, supra note 8, at 1811. 
 230 Generally speaking, scholars and courts have struggled to define criminal punishment 
and—at the margins—to distinguish between civil and criminal punishments. See, e.g., Austin 
v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 621–22 (1993); United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 449 (1989), 
abrogated by Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93 (1997); United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 
251 (1980); Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Civil and Criminal Sanctions in the Constitution and 
Courts, 94 GEO. L.J. 1, 3 (2005); Carol S. Steiker, Punishment and Procedure: Punishment 
Theory and the Criminal-Civil Procedural Divide, 85 GEO. L.J. 775, 809–13 (1997). 
 231 See generally JACOBS, supra note 1, at 279–81 (reporting on studies that demonstrate that 
black job applicants with criminal records are less likely to find employment than similarly 
situated white applicants); PAGER, supra note 1 (same); Agan & Starr, supra note 53. 
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In a sense, then, the reason that this proposal faces major 
implementation obstacles or has glaring flaws is the very reason that 
criminal employment law is so troubling: it is both certain and 
uncertain. As a descriptive matter, we know that individuals with 
criminal records face discrimination and adverse consequences in the 
workplace.232 And we know the laws and legal arrangements that 
underpin this mistreatment. But we cannot be certain who ultimately 
will make these decisions or how they will make them. The collateral 
consequences themselves remain contingent. They are a critical 
component of the criminal system as an extension of punishment. At 
the same time, they remain external to the criminal system, shaped by 
private actors and civil legal rules and regulations. The criminal 
dimension is contingent on civil legal relations, and the public, punitive 
force is contingent on private decision-makers. 
Taking this issue of contingency as a frame, then, the next Part will 
ask what criminal employment law can tell us about both the private 
aspects of the criminal system and the public aspects of the employment 
relationship. 
IV.     THE IMPLICATIONS OF CRIMINAL EMPLOYMENT LAW 
What is wrong with criminal employment law? The policy 
proposals discussed in the Part III are important, but they are narrow 
solutions for narrow problems. They treat collateral consequences in the 
labor market as the product of narrow decisions and narrow doctrinal 
problems, each in need of a fix.233 Yet they fail to address the broader set 
 
 232 See supra text accompanying note 35. 
 233 It is worth noting that much of the legal (as opposed to sociological or criminological) 
literature on employment consequences of conviction comes in the form of short student pieces 
geared towards offering a proposed statute for a given state. See, e.g., Elizabeth A. Gerlach, 
Comment, The Background Check Balancing Act: Protecting Applicants with Criminal 
Convictions While Encouraging Criminal Background Checks in Hiring, 8 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. 
L. 981, 1000 (2006); Mark Minuti, Note, Employer Liability Under the Doctrine of Negligent 
Hiring: Suggested Methods for Avoiding the Hiring of Dangerous Employees, 13 DEL. J. CORP. L. 
501, 523 (1988); Katherine A. Peebles, Note, Negligent Hiring and the Information Age: How 
State Legislatures Can Save Employers from Inevitable Liability, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1397, 
1419 (2012); Nancy B. Sasser, Comment, “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell”: Negligent Hiring Law in 
Virginia and the Necessity of Legislation to Protect Ex-Convicts from Employment 
Discrimination, 41 U. RICH. L. REV. 1063, 1090 (2007); James R. Todd, Comment, “It’s Not My 
Problem”: How Workplace Violence and Potential Employer Liability Lead to Employment 
Discrimination of Ex-Convicts, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 725, 757 (2004). While these Notes and 
Comments offer a range of important proposals, they also demonstrate the need for broader 
more sustained treatment of criminal employment law and its place within the broader 
framework of both employment law and criminal law. Cf. Mayson, supra note 201, at 309 (“We 
may have reached a watershed moment for [collateral consequences] policy. On the other hand, 
none of the recent [collateral consequences] policy developments are comprehensive, and most 
are wholly aspirational.”). 
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of legal relationships in which each decision or doctrine is imbedded. 
Perhaps the most obvious lesson to be learned from an examination of 
criminal employment law is the one reached by most scholars of 
collateral consequences: punishment can be invisible, and if we want to 
calibrate punishment properly or lessen its impact on individuals and 
communities, we need to unmask invisible punishment.234 While that is 
an important lesson, it does not cut broadly enough. Certainly, revealing 
hidden aspects of punishment is critical to addressing the problems of 
mass incarceration, and I hope to contribute to the broader project 
embodied by the ABA Standards, the NICCC, and the growing body of 
legal and sociological literature on these costs. But, what the previous 
Part emphasized was the way that—in the employment context—
something else is at work. 
What is significant, troubling, and in need of reform in the 
employment context is not only that employment consequences do not 
appear at sentence. Criminal employment law is significant because it 
also shows the ways in which criminal law has become private, the ways 
in which private actors may become a part of the punitive apparatus, 
extending the effects of punishment without formal checks. And, at the 
same time, it shows us how employment is public,235 how private 
employers serve quasi-governmental functions as wielders of 
disciplinary force and as gatekeepers to benefits, rights, and 
opportunities. This Part will address the public/private distinction as it 
applies to criminal employment law, focusing first on the private 
dimensions of criminal law, before shifting to examine the public 
dimensions of employment law (or, more precisely, the employment 
relationship).236 My claim is not that there is a clear or coherent line 
 
 234 See, e.g., Chin, The New Civil Death, supra note 8, at 1830; Pinard & Thompson, supra 
note 46, at 590–93; Travis, supra note 6, at 15–17; Roberts, supra note 5, at 677. 
 235 As Martha Minnow has observed,  
[d]efining what is “public” and what is “private” turns out to be complicated in part 
due to the history of interconnections between governmental and private 
initiatives. . . . In the United States, “public” has potentially three meanings: (1) 
pertaining to the government, (2) pertaining to spaces and processes open to the 
general population or “the people,” or (3) pertaining to any sphere outside the most 
intimate, which usually means outside of the home and family. 
Martha Minow, Public and Private Partnerships: Accounting for the New Religion, 116 HARV. L. 
REV. 1229, 1229 n.1 (2003). 
 236 Because doctrinal employment law encompasses not only aspects of tort and contract, 
but also statutory provisions (e.g., Title VII, the Fair Labor Standards Act), it is uncontested 
that there are public components of employment law. See, e.g., Arthur S. Leonard, A New 
Common Law of Employment Termination, 66 N.C. L. REV. 631, 686 n.295 (1988); Lisa Rodgers, 
Public Employment and Access to Justice in Employment Law, 43 INDUS. L.J. 373, 373 (2014) 
(“In general terms, employment law sits uneasily on that public/private divide: although 
founded on a ‘private’ contract of employment the regulation of that contract is steeped in 
matters pertaining to the more general public interest.”); Naomi Schoenbaum, It’s Time That 
You Know: The Shortcomings of Ignorance as Fairness in Employment Law and the Need for an 
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between private and public. Rather, I hope to highlight the 
inconsistency in a regime where employers subjugate workers’ rights to 
the “public” interest, but where workers have limited legal recourse 
against employers because they are “private” actors.237 Criminal 
employment law therefore shows that the public/private distinction is 
not a line at all, but a semi-permeable membrane. 
A.     Private Criminal Law 
Outside of the collateral consequences frame, privatization and the 
role of private actors in the criminal system increasingly have garnered 
academic attention over the last few decades. In their treatments of 
criminal law’s private dimensions, scholars have focused primarily on 
private prisons,238 with a lesser emphasis on private policing.239 To many 
critics of these institutions, privatization of punitive functions 
represents a victory of neoliberal governance principles—the state 
purports to retain a monopoly on violence, but it does so by 
commodifying and marketizing state violence (in the form of private 
prison and policing contracts).240 Law enforcement and incarceration, 
like other government functions, have become the province of market-
based thinking and market-primacy. Viewed through this lens, the turn 
to private actors in the criminal legal system represents an embrace of 
an “economistic” view of state services that prioritizes cost and 
efficiency over values of rehabilitation, socialization, or even 
retribution.241 Further, by allowing private market actors into the 
management of the criminal system, policy makers have created a 
 
“Information-Shifting” Model, 30 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 99, 150 (2007). My claim in this Article 
and in this Part, however, is that the employment relationship in and of itself may be public 
because of the public functions assigned to private employers. See supra Section IV.B. 
 237 See James Atleson, Confronting Judicial Values: Rewriting the Law of Work in a Common 
Law System, 45 BUFF. L. REV. 435, 443 (1997); Karl E. Klare, The Public/Private Distinction in 
Labor Law, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1358, 1362 (1982). 
 238 See, e.g., Sharon Dolovich, State Punishment and Private Prisons, 55 DUKE L.J. 437, 441 
(2005); Richard Harding, Private Prisons, 28 CRIME & JUST. 265, 265 (2001); Benjamin Levin, 
Inmates for Rent, Sovereignty for Sale: The Global Prison Market, 23 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 509, 
549 (2014); Ira P. Robbins, Privatization of Corrections: Defining the Issues, 40 VAND. L. REV. 
813 (1987); Clifford J. Rosky, Force, Inc.: The Privatization of Punishment, Policing, and 
Military Force in Liberal States, 36 CONN. L. REV. 879, 902 (2004). 
 239 See, e.g., Elizabeth E. Joh, The Paradox of Private Policing, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
49 (2004); Rosky, supra note 238, at 896–99; David A. Sklansky, The Private Police, 46 UCLA L. 
REV. 1165, 1166–68, 1199 (1999). 
 240 See, e.g., BERNARD E. HARCOURT, THE ILLUSION OF FREE MARKETS: PUNISHMENT AND 
THE MYTH OF NATURAL ORDER 233–39 (2011); Rosky, supra note 238, at 880. 
 241 See Dolovich, supra note 238, at 544; cf. Richard Michael Fischl, “Running the 
Government Like a Business”: Wisconsin and the Assault on Workplace Democracy, 121 YALE 
L.J. ONLINE 39, 39–41 (2011) (critiquing the move to focus on efficiency in government 
operations at the expense of other values). 
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pernicious dynamic: private prison contractors and other stakeholders 
lack incentives to reduce prison populations; instead, these private 
actors benefit from large prison populations and punitive criminal laws 
that ensure a continuing need for the “prison industrial complex.”242 
Beyond the political economy critique, scholars have also 
emphasized the ways in which private actors complicate and even 
undermine the purposes of punishment.243 For example, in addressing 
prison privatization through a retributive lens, Mary Sigler argues that 
“[p]unishment is . . . meaningful not primarily as a means to an end; 
rather, punishment instantiates justice. The delegation of punishment 
through prison privatization attenuates the meaning of punishment in a 
liberal state and undermines the institution of criminal justice.”244 That 
is, to the extent that criminal law is meant to embody some sort of 
collective consciousness or shared moral opprobrium,245 a system that 
employs private actors or that implicates private motives may fail to 
advance the public interest. Private actors have private incentives and 
concerns—concerns that they might share with other members of the 
society, but that need not be embodied formally in criminal law or in the 
official policies that shape the criminal system.246 In short, what is 
troubling about private actors in the criminal system is not only their 
incentives and their status within a market economy; it is their 
legitimacy. We lack a clear justification for why they (rather than the 
state, or other private actors) are entitled to exercise force and discipline 
over other members of the polity. If criminal law is—at least in part—
rooted in socialization (or social control), then how can actors without 
the imprimatur of the state or the stamp of democratic legitimacy 
perform the rituals of punishment and/or formal societal 
condemnation? 
 
 242 For discussions on the prison industrial complex, see Gabriel Arkles, Correcting Race and 
Gender: Prison Regulation of Social Hierarchy Through Dress, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 859, 865 n.26 
(2012); Kimberlé W. Crenshaw, From Private Violence to Mass Incarceration: Thinking 
Intersectionally About Women, Race, and Social Control, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1418, 1420 n.1 
(2012); cf. William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505 
(2001) (describing the political and economic forces that drive support for harsh criminal 
policies). 
 243 See, e.g., Dolovich, supra note 238, at 543–44; Levin, supra note 238, at 549; Mary Sigler, 
Private Prisons, Public Functions, and the Meaning of Punishment, 38 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 149, 
151 (2010). 
 244 Sigler, supra note 243, at 151. 
 245 See, e.g., ÉMILE DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY 58 (George Simpson 
trans., 1964); DAVID GARLAND, PUNISHMENT AND MODERN SOCIETY: A STUDY IN SOCIAL 
THEORY 67–68 (1990). 
 246 As noted above, employers could have a range of reasons to treat individuals with 
criminal records differently from other applicants or employees. See supra Part II. They 
certainly could be motivated by a desire to express moral condemnation, but they also could be 
focused on maximizing profits, attracting more costumers, or protecting consumers or other 
employees. 
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Given the general lack of engagement with private decision-makers 
in the collateral consequences literature, it is not surprising that this 
public/private debate has gone largely unexplored. In looking at 
criminal employment law as a species of “informal” collateral 
consequences, however, the problems of private actors become 
increasing salient. Of course, a vast network of statutory criminal 
employment law exists that does not implicate private actors, or, at least, 
that does not implicate the discretion of private actors.247 But, the 
corners of criminal employment law described in this Article—the tort 
doctrines and the employee conduct policies—rest on the decisions of 
private employers. That is, the statutory frameworks, coupled with the 
tort doctrines create a labor market in which private employers are 
tasked with and/or empowered to continue to discipline workers based 
on the past or on parallel proceedings of the criminal system. 
Certainly, private employers in this narrative occupy a different 
position from private prison companies, private security firms, and the 
other actors critiqued by scholars of criminal law’s turn to privatization. 
Prison contractors have powerful incentives to support the carceral 
state,248 but it is unclear that employers do. An employer’s decision not 
to employ an ex-offender may be rooted in a calculus of efficiency, 
trustworthiness, or risk aversion,249 but there is no reason to assume that 
employers benefit directly from the legal regime that discourages hiring 
people with criminal records or that employers have some stake in 
preserving it.250 
Yet, to the extent we find compelling the privatization critiques in 
other corners of the criminal legal system, I think that those critiques 
should be a source of concern here as well.251 In one of the only articles 
to treat employer discipline through the lens of punishment theory, 
Janine Kim and Matthew Parlow argued that some types of employer 
discipline (specifically, in the sports context) resemble private 
policing.252 Adopting an expressivist approach, Kim and Parlow suggest 
 
 247 See supra text accompanying notes 41–48. 
 248 See, e.g., Dolovich, supra note 238, at 474–80; Sigler, supra note 243, at 151. 
 249 See supra note 75 and accompanying text. 
 250 Indeed, as discussed below in Section IV.B., there may be reason to think that the way in 
which the effective deputization of employers described in this Article may be more of a burden 
than a boon. 
 251 It is worth noting that criminal law, despite its status as “public” law has long had 
“private” components or served private ends. See Benjamin Levin, American Gangsters: Rico, 
Criminal Syndicates, and Conspiracy Law as Market Control, 48 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 105, 
118 (2013). Indeed, private prisons may not be that far removed from earlier moments of 
incarceration that relied on convict leasing and other public/private prison labor regimes. See 
Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 626 (2000); cf. 
Gary Peller, Public Imperialism and Private Resistance: Progressive Possibilities of the New 
Private Law, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 1001, 1005 (1996) (arguing that ostensibly “public” areas 
historically have not represented the public or have had private dimensions). 
 252 See Kim & Parlow, supra note 15, at 590; cf. Kent Greenawalt, Punishment, in 
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that the disciplining of workers by professional sports leagues, via 
employee conduct policies, may send the same sort of public signals that 
are traditionally associated with criminal punishment.253 In their 
account, this “punishment” need not supplant state action or formal 
prosecution in order to implicate considerations of proportionality and 
public morality.254 That is, the NFL personnel conduct policy—and 
similar provisions—significantly extend the logic and effects of criminal 
punishment.255 
In some sense, then, criminal employment law, much like the other 
turns to private actors, fundamentally alters the institutions and 
operations of the criminal system. The monopoly on state violence that 
has been used historically to justify criminal law and criminal 
punishment is (or at least purportedly is) checked by constitutional 
rights and private causes of action.256 The rules of criminal procedure, 
the Bill of Rights, and the causes of action under state and federal civil 
rights statutes create a framework under which state action remains 
bounded. On the one hand, punitive force is justified by the language of 
democratic theory and political legitimacy.257 On the other, punitive 
force and the power of the state to discipline have their limitations, 
restrictions that nominally grant individuals some protection from 
official overreach or a criminal system run amok. Put simply, the state 
action both empowers (via the monopoly on violence) and constrains 
(via constitutional checks). 
Unlike traditional criminal law, criminal employment law is 
neither fish nor fowl. It is not state action, at least not as most lawyers, 
scholars, and courts understand it.258 While the Supreme Court has held 
 
FOUNDATIONS OF CRIMINAL LAW 48, 48 (Leo Katz et al. eds., 1999) (arguing that punishment 
occurs whenever “persons who possess authority impose designedly unpleasant consequences 
upon, and express their condemnation of, other persons who are capable of choice and who 
have breached established standards of behavior”); Miriam H. Baer, Choosing Punishment, 92 
B.U. L. REV. 577, 580 (2012) (defining punishment in terms of public morality). 
 253 See Kim & Parlow, supra note 15, at 590. As discussed at length above, Kim and Parlow 
emphasize that special properties of professional sports (notably, the culture of publicity and 
media attention surrounding the industry) might make this insight particularly applicable in 
that context. See sources cited supra note 102. 
 254 See Kim & Parlow, supra note 15, at 590–97. 
 255 My claim here is not that such policies and employer discipline satisfy the formal 
definition of punishment; rather, my claim is that employer decision-making extends the effects 
of punishment, thus implicating employers in the criminal system’s punitive apparatus. 
 256 See, e.g., Nicholson v. Williams, 203 F. Supp. 2d 153, 253 (E.D.N.Y. 2002), modified, 294 
F. Supp. 2d 369 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (“It is a long held maxim that the state holds a monopoly on 
violence . . . .”); Susan Dimock, Criminalizing Dangerousness: How to Preventively Detain 
Dangerous Offenders, 9 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 537, 552 (2015); Austin Sarat, Violence, Representation, 
and Responsibility in Capital Trials: The View from the Jury, 70 IND. L.J. 1103, 1134 (1995). 
 257 See Sharon Dolovich, Legitimate Punishment in Liberal Democracy, 7 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 
307, 312–13 (2004). 
 258 Cf. Ira P. Robbins, The Legal Dimensions of Private Incarceration, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 531, 
577–604 (1989) (describing the challenges posed by attempting to apply the state action 
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that “[s]tate action . . . refers to exertions of state power in all forms,”259 
the state action doctrine remains dreadfully muddled, a constant source 
of irritation for both courts and scholars.260 Therefore, in contexts like 
criminal employment law, where governmental involvement in the 
ultimate conduct by employers is attenuated at best, it is unlikely that 
constitutional criminal procedure principles would be applied to private 
employers. As a result, while private employers lack some of the powers 
and responsibilities of the state (to incarcerate, to use force, etc.), they 
also lack the institutional checks on state action. To the extent that the 
state retains the moral authority and political legitimacy to punish, it 
need not follow that private employers also do. And, more practically, 
when the state gets it wrong—i.e., punishes an innocent defendant, 
commits unjustified violence—Bivens,261 42 U.S.C. § 1983,262 and other 
legal mechanisms exist to correct, or at least address, the error. When 
private actors err, it is much harder for the wronged party to seek 
recourse successfully.263 In George v. Pacific-CSC Work Furlough, for 
example, the Ninth Circuit rejected a claim that a private prison 
contracting company was a state actor when it came to claims regarding 
how it treated prison employees.264 Similarly, in Holly v. Scott, the 
Fourth Circuit reached the same result in rejecting a constitutional 
claim against correctional officers employed by a private prison 
company.265 
From a practical standpoint, therefore, the “private” nature of 
criminal employment law makes it difficult to devise a legal solution. 
The policy proposals discussed above each hit a wall when we consider 
that the effects for ex-offenders rely on private decision-makers. That is, 
criminal employment law remains distinct from the “formal” collateral 
 
doctrine to private prison officials). 
 259 Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 20 (1948). 
 260 See, e.g., Charles L. Black, Jr., Foreword: “State Action,” Equal Protection, and California’s 
Proposition 14, 81 HARV. L. REV. 69, 95 (1967); Erwin Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 80 
NW. U. L. REV. 503, 503–04 (1985) (“There still are no clear principles for determining whether 
state action exists.”); Gary Peller & Mark Tushnet, State Action and a New Birth of Freedom, 92 
GEO. L.J. 779, 817 (2004); Sklansky, supra note 239, at 1229–80. 
 261 See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (allowing for private 
rights of action based on deprivation of rights by federal actors). 
 262 See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) (allowing for a private right of action based on deprivation of 
rights by state actors). 
 263 See, e.g., Michele Estrin Gilman, Legal Accountability in an Era of Privatized Welfare, 89 
CALIF. L. REV. 569, 631 (2001). But see Rosborough v. Mgmt. & Training Corp., 350 F.3d 459, 
461 (5th Cir. 2003) (treating private prison contractors as state actors for section 1983 
purposes). For a discussion on the challenges of applying the state action doctrine to private 
actors in the criminal system, see Sklansky, supra note 239, at 1229–80. 
 264 George v. Pac.-CSC Work Furlough, 91 F.3d 1227, 1230 (9th Cir. 1996). 
 265 Holly v. Scott, 434 F.3d 287, 292 (4th Cir. 2006); see also King v. Hilgert, No. 
4:13CV3061, 2015 WL 1119451, at *5 (D. Neb. Mar. 11, 2015) (finding that private prison 
employee was not a state actor); Shapiro v. Cmty. First Servs., Inc., No. 11-CV-4061 
(KAM)(LB), 2014 WL 1276479, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2014) (same). 
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consequences addressed in the Standards because it is contingent on the 
decisions of private actors who lack any official relationship to the 
criminal legal system.266 Outside of the limited Title VII examples 
discussed above,267 “public law” generally does not recognize criminal 
employment law or acknowledge these consequences as a part of the 
criminal law universe. In a sense, then, criminal employment law 
reproduces the problems of privatization in other areas of the criminal 
system and illustrates the ways in which private prisons and other 
targets of critique are not unique. The justice system is a massive 
apparatus, a network of institutions, laws, and legal actors that extends 
well beyond police, courts, and prisons. And that means that the 
problems with the criminal system—its social and economic costs, its 
racially disparate impact, etc.—implicate actors who are not formal state 
actors and who are not formal officers of the criminal system. 
William Stuntz famously argued that the expansiveness and 
punitive nature of the criminal law were the products of a particular 
political economy.268 Stuntz claimed that the electoral incentives of 
prosecutors, legislators, and judges combined to make criminal law a 
one-way ratchet, yielding a larger and harsher criminal system.269 These 
“pathological politics” had driven an explosion in prison populations 
and a criminal system that had grown to an unprecedented size.270 What 
is remarkable when we consider criminal employment law, though, are 
the ways in which criminal law’s pathological politics and troubled 
incentives bleed out of the elected branches, and even out of the formal 
confines of the criminal system. To appreciate the current state of the 
criminal system requires stepping outside of the scope of Stuntz’s frame 
and recognizing that the private market and private market actors 
continue to replicate and re-inscribe the harms of the criminal law. The 
issue is less that private actors are necessarily worse for criminal 
defendants, for justice, or for the operation of the criminal system. 
Rather, it’s that if these private actors play an important role in the 
functioning of the criminal system, they should be treated accordingly. 
 
 266 See supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
 267 See supra Section III.C. 
 268 See generally Stuntz, supra note 242. 
 269 See id. at 528–65. 
 270 See id. This is not to say that the criminal system of earlier moments was not beset by its 
own pathologies and deep-seated structural flaws. See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Book Review, 
Criminal Justice, Local Democracy, and Constitutional Rights, 111 MICH. L. REV. 1045, 1086–87 
(2013). 
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B.     Public Employment Law 
Much as the criminal law has metastasized, so too has the role and 
function of employers as purveyors of social services and as the vehicle 
by which social and economic policy is implemented. In this respect, 
criminal employment law is also transforming the employment 
relationship and the limits of employee privacy. Writing in 1991, Vivian 
Berger, then-General Counsel to the American Civil Liberties Union, 
predicted a future in which the greatest threats to civil liberties might 
come not only from the state, but also from private actors: 
Above all, business organizations have come to assume a hegemony 
over their workers’ lives rivaling that of the national government at 
the time the Bill of Rights was adopted. Technology has greatly 
enhanced this power: many companies routinely monitor employee 
phone calls and other activities by means of electronic devices or 
require intrusive polygraph tests before or during the course of 
employment. Increasingly, too, in order to reduce . . . costs or for 
other self-interested reasons, employers are attempting to control the 
personal lives of workers.271 
Criminal employment law is a powerful indicator that such a future 
already has arrived.272 
Employment law and the employment relationship have long 
occupied a peculiar place at the boundaries of public and private.273 And 
the contours of the distinction have long been manipulated to justify 
varying degrees of judicial intervention in employment contracting.274 
Prior to the New Deal moment, courts and legislators treated 
employment as the product of a private relationship between employer 
and employee.275 This approach meant that courts and legislators viewed 
the enforcement of contracts as their province, but shied away from or 
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outwardly disclaimed the public or social implications of private 
orderings.276 Employment was regarded as a “dominant-servient 
relation rather than one of mutual rights and obligations.”277 Under 
such a conception of employment, “[t]he employer, as owner of the 
enterprise, is viewed as owning the job with a property right to control 
the job and the worker who fills it. . . . The employer is sovereign over 
his or her employee subjects.”278 There was no place for public 
considerations or for a treatment of the contract as embedded in or 
shaping the social, economic, and political conditions of the public 
sphere.279 
The New Deal moment saw a reimagining of the employment 
relationship. To the new school of legal realist scholars, all law was 
public.280 Contracting parties negotiated against a set of background 
rules—distributions of power and property created by political 
decisions, rather than a natural, “free” market.281 Where courts had 
previously struck down employment regulations as impinging on the 
constitutional right to freedom of contract,282 the Court began to adopt 
more of a realist approach and shifted away from the clean, formalist 
public/private distinction in regulating the workplace.283 The New Deal 
era saw the passage of statutes that regulated the terms and conditions 
of employment, and ensuing decades have seen a range of such statutes 
erode further at-will employment and the Lochner-era conception of 
employment as private.284 But, aspects of the earlier conception of 
employment remain: employers can generally fire employees without 
cause,285 and, as the discussion in Part II highlighted, courts and 
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legislatures still defer to the preferences and business interests of 
employers.286 That is, if the categories retain any descriptive or 
theoretical value, employment law is at once private and public. 
This is an oversimplified account of employment law’s 
development and the shift away from a purely private conception of 
employment law. But this history is important to understanding the 
significance of criminal employment law’s place in the current 
public/private model. Criminal employment law is both public and 
private in two ways: (1) it is subject to statutory regulation, but it is also 
the province of private agreements; and (2) it is premised on the belief 
that employers should (or, at least, can) serve the public interest, but it 
also depends on a view of employment where employers are allowed to 
prioritize their own private business interests. The first public/private 
point is simply a restatement of the realist claim about the public/private 
distinction and is true of most areas of the law.287 Therefore, it does not 
require further discussion. But the second represents a new approach to 
employment regulation—an approach that criminal employment law 
exemplifies. 
A central claim of this Article is that criminal employment law 
makes employers complicit in certain aspects of the criminal system. 
That is, the tort doctrines, combined with the statutory licensing 
schemes and public consumer support for employer discipline of 
workers, has led to a system in which employers effectively serve a 
public function. By situating this “private punishment” within a broader 
frame of privatization literature,288 I hope to emphasize the ways in 
which the ends of criminal employment law map onto the aims of 
criminal punishment. In carrying out these ends, though, employers 
may well engage in a range of practices that vitiate worker privacy (e.g., 
email searches, GPS tracking, exhaustive background checking, and 
extensive limitations on conduct away from work).289 And, while public-
sector employees enjoy some Fourth and First Amendment 
protections,290 private-sector employees do not and have limited 
recourse at common law.291 To the extent that employee conduct 
policies reach conduct away from work, employers may exercise an 
almost unlimited jurisdiction to impose the moral force of criminal (or 
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quasi-criminal) law.292 
Therefore, employers take on public responsibility that justifies 
intrusions into worker privacy and exacerbates the imbalance of 
workplace power relations. At the same time, employers remain private, 
unchecked by the Constitution, and shielded from liability by judicial 
deference to the same private values of workplace efficiency and 
business-owner autonomy that justified the pre-realist freedom of 
contract cases.293 To the extent that we are uncomfortable with the idea 
of private employers being treated as state actors, unshielded by their 
private status, it is worth asking why. And, if it wouldn’t make sense to 
treat private employers as state actors for liability purposes, then why 
does it make sense to allow them to take on state functions? 
Richard Epstein has argued in favor of employment at will as more 
protective of individual rights.294 By this logic, the real concern for 
workers should be the state; a legal system that makes it easier to get in 
and out of contractual relationships is one that maximizes the power of 
private actors, and therefore maximizes liberty.295 Without rehashing 
the realist/formalist debates of the 1930s,296 I think it is important to 
emphasize the ways in which criminal employment law undermines 
Epstein’s argument. If the concern is state power, then what happens 
when it becomes harder to distinguish between the private and the 
public, the employer and the state? That is, even if we were prepared to 
accept Epstein’s dismissal of realist concerns for background rules, his 
argument appears to be premised on a belief that employers and 
employees are seeking to maximize profits or efficiency, not that they 
are seeking to enforce broader conceptions of morality. To the extent 
that employers are acting to advance quasi-public punitive goals, then 
why should we be less concerned by these private actors than by the 
state? Or, even if we accept that state punishment is more severe than 
private punishment so that we should be more concerned, why does it 
follow that we shouldn’t still worry about the disciplining power of 
employers? 
When considering employer power and employers’ function within 
the system of criminal employment law, it is worth considering the costs 
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to employers as well as employees that such a regime creates. Whether 
criminal employment law empowers employers or burdens them is not 
entirely clear. Certainly, as discussed in the context of conduct policies, 
some criminal employment law institutions (and some public calls to 
action) empower employers and grant them even more authority over 
workers. But, as discussed above, tort doctrines impose clear burdens on 
employers and expose them to liability if they fail to take account of 
criminal histories.297 Similarly, the range of occupational licensing 
statutes and regulations restrict who an employer may hire.298 And, as 
noted in the context of employee conduct policies, consumers and 
clients often hold employers responsible for the conduct of their 
employees, even conduct with little to no relationship to work or the 
workplace.299 Combine these burdens with some of the reform proposals 
discussed earlier, and it is easy to see how employers are often left 
between a rock and a hard place. Hiring or retaining those with criminal 
records may, in some cases, trigger civil suits or state regulatory action, 
while, in other cases, refraining from doing so might prompt EEOC 
action. Put simply, the disparate and internally inconsistent web of 
criminal employment law may well whipsaw employers,300 forcing them 
to choose a least-worst option when presented with possible sources of 
liability.301 
Ultimately, though, intention need not be an essential component 
of our analysis. If we are concerned with effects (as most collateral 
consequences literature is),302 then what matters most is the impact that 
the decisions have, not the motivations that drive the decisions. That is, 
employers might be acting wholly rationally or their motives and 
preferences might be sympathetic. But, if the problem with criminal 
employment law is that it has shifted decision-making to unaccountable 
actors and has extended the scope of punishment, then it should matter 
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relatively little whether those unaccountable actors are right or wrong 
when they make decisions. 
In this respect, employer intent might be a red herring that 
distracts from the risks posed and harms done by criminal employment 
law. Attempting to show animus (or lack thereof) removes focus from 
the effects of the doctrines and institutions described in this Article. As I 
noted at the outset, one goal of this Article is to begin to understand why 
criminal employment law exists—i.e., what incentives and ideologies 
shape employer decisions and legal rules. But focusing too much on 
individual employers as good or bad actors obscures the broader 
structural forces that shape their decisions. Indeed, one of the problems 
with a number of the narrow fixes discussed in Part III is that they are 
responsive to individual acts or individual actors, rather than the 
underlying structures of inequality that define both the criminal legal 
system and the labor market.303 
In calling for broader structural solutions to the problems of 
workplace inequality, Samuel Bagenstos has argued that “[w]e have 
reached, or will soon reach, the limits of what our current conception of 
employment discrimination law can do to solve the persistent problems 
of workplace inequity.”304 That is, “[m]any of today’s most significant 
problems are structural and are widely understood to lie beyond the 
responsibility of individual employers.”305 Regardless of whether 
Bagenstos is right about the effectiveness of Title VII suits as a form of 
impact litigation,306 his underlying insight resonates here. Each 
employer is only one component of a broader social, economic, and 
political system. The problems of criminal employment law are broader 
structural problems that implicate the inequality of bargaining power 
and the social and economic conditions of those with criminal 
records.307 
Criminal employment law tells us about more than the lack of 
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employee privacy and the lack of a clear line between public and private. 
It illustrates the power imbalance of the modern workplace. In 
examining the rise of employer email monitoring, Rosa Ehrenreich 
Brooks describes the problem as “a power issue that stems both from the 
deep structure of American employment law and from the economic 
and social framework of our society more broadly.”308 Because a fired 
worker will suffer “some tangible and extremely unpleasant economic 
harms,”309 any doctrine or legal institution that allows employers to 
monitor or discharge furthers the liminality of a vulnerable or marginal 
worker. In Brooks’s frame, each policy 
is only a symptom. The problem is that despite the erosion of at-
will employer traditional privileges, most American workers have 
very little power in relation to their employers. Most can be fired 
for an astonishingly large number of reasons and can have an 
awful lot of their rights infringed upon with impunity. The 
solution to this problem is not the creation of laws or policies 
forbidding e-mail monitoring by employers, although that would 
be helpful as a first step. The solution would involve a radical 
overhaul of employment law.310 
This Article does not purport to offer a vision for what such an 
overhaul would entail. But Brooks’s insight is critical to understanding 
what is wrong with criminal employment law. Entrusting private 
employers with enforcing criminal law has costs for the criminal system, 
but it also has costs for individual workers who face a system of almost-
unchecked employer discipline—a system in which unaccountable 
actors are tasked with weeding out the good from the bad and imposing 
their own brand of punishment. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has argued that criminal employment law is 
transforming the nature of the employment relationship and the 
delivery of criminal punishment. This hybrid public/private and 
civil/criminal institution exacerbates both the punitive turn in criminal 
law and the marginalization of those with criminal records. Like many 
questions of criminal justice reform, the best policy solution is not 
immediately apparent. As I have shown, there are a range of possible 
solutions already on the table, but each of them has its weaknesses—
weaknesses that show how and why criminal employment law is 
becoming an intractable problem in the U.S. labor market. 
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“We have become a nation of employees,” observed sociologist 
Frank Tannenbaum in 1951.311 Because of the reliance on wages and the 
relationship between employment and social and economic benefits, 
“the substance of life is in another man’s hands.”312 Criminal 
employment law shows us the costs of a continued reliance on such a 
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